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ABSTRACT 
 The goal of this study was to provide Marine Corps 
manpower planners a more reliable tool for forecasting 
enlistment supply at the local market level. This research 
develops contract production models at the Recruiting Sub 
Station level to estimate the effects of local economic 
conditions, demographics, and recruiting resources on new 
high quality male contract production. Focusing the analysis 
on the sub station level allows the impact of recruiting 
resources to be more accurately predicted and enables a more 
efficient allocation of resources. The supply models used 
pooled time series-cross sectional data from FY03 to FY07, 
which provided 10,702 observations for estimation. The 
contract supply model was specified as a log-log functional 
form. The results found that Marine recruiters are the most 
significant predictor of new contract production. 
Additionally, other DoD recruiters were estimated to be 
positively related to Marine Corps new contract production, 
suggesting complimentary recruitment efforts.  Finally, both 
the local unemployment rate and the military-civilian pay 
ratio were positively associated with contract production, 
but the estimated effects were not always statistically 
significant. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
On June 5, 2007, the Marine Corps received 
Congressional approval to increase end strength by 9,000 
Marines for fiscal year 2008. An annual incremental increase 
will continue until fiscal year 2011 when total end strength 
for the Marine Corps will reach 202,000, as compared to the 
current 2007 level of 175,000. This increase has made 
forecasting accessions an even more vital part of manpower 
planning. In order to successfully plan accessions to build 
the force the Marine Corps must be able to, as accurately as 
possible, predict not only general enlistment contract 
numbers but also the high quality male enlistment contracts 
that will fill technical enlisted positions within the 
Marine Corps. 
End strength is the total number of personnel within a 
service, and is calculated as the personnel at the beginning 
of the fiscal year minus the losses plus gains that are 
recalculated at the end of the fiscal year. Maximum end 
strength is mandated by Congress, and any excess of the 
approved end strength at the end of a fiscal year is 
identified as an overage. There are only two circumstances 
where end strength overages are tolerated. The Secretary of 
the Navy (SECNAV) must authorize a two percent overage, and 
the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) must approve a three 
percent overage. There is no authorized number for falling 
under end strength. However, not accurately forecasting the 
recruitment of high quality male enlistments may lead to 
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recruiting, and thus manning, shortages in technical 
enlisted occupations, which could bring on operational 
consequences. 
The accurate forecasting of contracts has an impact on 
the Marine Corps’ annual budget. As of 2004 manpower cost 
was around $9.4 billion, about 60% of the Marine Corps’ 
annual budget (MARINE CORPS END STRENGTH INCREASE, 2007). A 
failure to accurately forecast contracts has a cascading 
effect on the budgeted funding for manpower. And because the 
budget is a constraint, it is very important that monthly 
forecasted contract rates be as close as possible to the 
actual contract rates. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to develop a model for 
forecasting the supply of high quality male applicants at 
the Recruiting Sub Station (RSS) level for the Marine Corps. 
Due to the rising accession missions and increasing 
recruiter levels it is necessary to be able to accurately 
predict the supply of high quality applicant contracts. With 
the increase in maximum end strength over the next three 
years, forecasting which local market areas are likely to 
generate high quality male applicants and enlistment 
contracts will allow for the appropriate allocation of 
recruiting resources to be applied to local markets that 
yield the most high quality male contracts. This research 
proposes to develop a model that will be used to forecast 
high quality male contracts based on local area 
characteristics that are significant predictors of 
enlistment propensity. 
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C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
While conducting research for this thesis, determining 
what factors are predictive of high quality male contracts 
within the Marine Corps was identified as a primary focus of 
study. In order to address this question, enlistment supply 
studies from the 1980’s through 2005 relating to all 
branches of service were reviewed. Although earlier studies 
are no longer current, many of the variables that were 
determined to affect the propensity to enlist may still 
predict enlistments today. 
The resulting scope of this thesis covers three 
distinct areas. First, a review of previous enlistment 
supply studies done on other services is conducted. Second, 
the current forecasting methods used within the Marine Corps 
and Navy will be reviewed. Third, the study will specify and 
estimate a statistical model for forecasting high quality 
male Marine Corps enlistment contracts at the local market 
level. 
A step-by-step methodological approach to completing 
the research associated with this thesis was conducted. 
Prior Department of Defense accessions studies and previous 
service-specific enlistment supply studies and models were 
reviewed. A thorough review of current forecasting models 
used by the Marine Corps and the Navy was conducted. 
Interviews were conducted with current enlisted manpower 
planners at Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) and Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses of current forecasting models. Data was collected 
at the Marine Corps Recruiting Sub Station (RSS) level by 
quarter from fiscal year 2003 (FY03) through fiscal year 
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2007 (FY07). Utilizing the gathered data, an enlistment 
supply model for the Marine Corps’ high quality contracts at 
the RSS was specified and estimated. Additionally, the 
availability of data to estimate an enlistment supply model 
at the zip code or county level was examined for use in 
follow-on research. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
As outlined in the Table of Contents, a comprehensive 
literature review will follow the Introduction. The 
literature review will look at the current forecasting model 
used by the Navy as well as previous accessions studies. A 
discussion of the data utilized throughout the thesis will 
follow the literature review. This discussion covers data 
collection, data summary, descriptive statistics, and the 
methodology of data processing and preparation for model 
development. Following the discussion of the data a detailed 
review of the model specification is covered. The model 
estimation includes the model specification, hypotheses to 
be tested, interpretation of the overall model and of 
individual variables. The thesis concludes with a summary 
and recommendations for follow-on research.   
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This study attempts to provide manpower planners a more 
reliable tool in forecasting enlisted accessions for high 
quality male applicants. This is a crucial step in growing 
the Marine Corps over the next three years. By accurately 
forecasting high quality male enlistment contracts at the 
Marine Corps RSS level a more accurate monthly recruiting 
goal by region for these applicants can be established. 
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Additionally, a more effective distribution of recruiting 
resources can be targeted to the local areas that are 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. NAVY ENLISTED SUPPLY FORECASTING MODEL 
1. Current Navy Forecasting Model 
When the All Volunteer Force (AFV) was established in 
1973, determining what factors attract high quality male 
applicants became necessary. The Service’s enlistment goals 
were not achieved in the late 1970’s leading to a focus on 
the factors that influenced civilians to enlist in the 
military. AVF composition studies have since extensively 
analyzed population size, population demographics and 
economic factors in order to determine how to target 
recruiting resources to those who are more likely to enlist. 
The current enlistment contracting model utilized by 
the Navy is called the Enlisted Goaling Model. This model is 
used to predict what the Navy identifies as “A-cell” 
contracts, consisting of High School Diploma Graduates 
(HSDG) scoring in the categories I through IIIA on the Armed 
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). In this study these 
individuals will be referred to as high quality male 
applicants. As noted by Hogan et al. (2000) this group is 
the focus population under the assumption that, “the 
services seldom meet their quota for the high quality 
enlistments and therefore estimated parameters are more 
likely to represent true structural supply effects.” The 
Navy identifies it’s A-cell recruits as more desirable 
because they have the highest program qualification rate, 
the lowest first term attrition, the lowest training costs, 
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fewer discipline problems, and best career performance, even 
though they are the most expensive to recruit (NCRC Goal 
Brief, 2007). This increased cost comes from having to 
compensate these recruits for the higher opportunity costs 
from further education or higher civilian wages that would 
be lost should these higher quality individuals choose to 
enlist. 
The Navy’s Enlisted Goal Model predicts Male A-cell 
production as a function of: past production; recruiter 
resources; economic factors; demographic factors; and other 
Naval Recruiting District (NRD) factors (NCRC Goal Brief, 
2007). The NRD serves as the equivalent of the Marine Corps 
Recruiting Station or RS.  The results of the model are used 
to forecast future contract production for the Regions and 
Districts which are then assigned their share of the 
contracts that are required for the given year. 
Specifically, the Navy’s Male HSDG I-IIIA Supply Model 
is based on NRD level data using a fixed effect, 
autoregressive form. The independent variables include: the 
number of naval recruiters; the unemployment rate; relative 
pay; the male HSDG I-IIIA population; the veteran 
population; the male HSDG IIIB population; advertising; 
enlisted bonus; patriotism/retention; historical net 
contracts obtained (NCO); Delayed Entry Program (DEP) 
effects, and other service recruiters identified as DoD 
recruiters. 
Ronald A. Hojnowski (2005) conducted a study comparing 
forecasted contracts based on the Navy’s Goaling Model and 
actual contracts obtained with data from 1994 to 2004. This 
comparison resulted in a ten year mean difference between 
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forecasted and actual contracts achieved of only 5.31%. This 
relative degree of accuracy has resulted in the Marine 
Corps’ desire to develop a similar enlisted contract supply 
model focused on high quality male applicants. 
Although the model in use by the Navy is relatively 
accurate, there have been various studies that have 
suggested changes be made to the model. In particular the 
advertising variable has been recommended for removal from 
the model. The inclusion of the advertising variable in 
various specifications of the model estimated in a Center 
for Naval Analyses (CNA) study (Goldhaber, 1999) resulted in 
the sign of the advertising variable being negative. This 
would imply that increases in advertising reduce recruiting 
efforts. This result is clearly counterintuitive to the true 
effects of advertising. The same study also found 
endogeneity of advertising implying the “possibility that 
there is a correlation between the advertising variable and 
the error term” (Goldhaber, 1999). Poor recruiting results 
lead to an increase in resources, including advertising 
dollars, applied to the recruiting effort. This increased 
overall effort makes it difficult to clearly identify the 
exact results of each resource in the overall effort. 
Although advertising expenditures may increase; time spent 
by recruiter’s may also increase both of which contributing 
to net contracts achieved.  
B. PREVIOUS ENLISTMENT SUPPLY STUDIES 
1. Geographical Recruiting Market Areas 
 Analyzing factors that affect the production of 
enlistment contracts must be targeted to specific 
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geographical areas. The Marine Corps currently 
geographically defines its recruiting area of operations 
into two recruiting regions (Eastern “ERR” and Western 
“WRR”), six districts (MCD 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12), 48 recruiting 
stations and over 600 RSS’s, Figure 1 depicts this 
operational area to the RS level. Recruiters are focused on 
obtaining new enlistment contracts at the local geographic 
level. For the Marine Corps this level is the RSS level and, 
as confirmed by other studies, should be the area of focus 
when conducting enlistment supply studies when local 
geographical area data is available. 
 Many previous Navy enlistment supply contract studies 
focus on the Naval Recruiting District (NRD), which is the 
equivalent to the Marine Corps’ Recruiting Station. This 
level of focus is beneficial in that it, “can be helpful in 
resource allocation decisions at a highly aggregated 
regional level” (Jarosz and Stephens, 1999). The Hojnowski 
(2005) that analyzed the Navy’s enlisted goaling and 
forecasting model, as it relates to the assignment of 
enlisted recruiting goal shares, focused on the NRD level 
with the intent of being used as a signaling tool. “The 
early projections of the model can be used to determine the 
likelihood of achieving recruiting success for the year 
ahead, particularly in the area of male, high quality 
recruits” (Hojnowski). Based on the Goaling Model’s results 
the Navy operates within a 5% variation between model 
estimation and actual achieved contracts for planning 
purposes. When the actual versus obtained contracted results 
are examined by each year for the same period a much larger 
variation is found. 
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Figure 2.1 From MCRC Area of Operation 2007 Brief 
 
 
From 1994 to 2004 forecasted contracts versus actual 
contracts ranged from -10.84% to 12.88%; this accounts for 
overestimating actual contracts by 10.84% to underestimating 
actual contracts by 12.88% (Hojnowski, 2005). Some of the 
reported variation may be caused by generalizing goaling 
efforts at the 31 NRDs (the Marine Corps RS equivalent) 
versus focusing on local geographical area where the 
recruiters are canvassing for recruits. It is at the 
recruiter’s level that model variables such as economics and 
recruiter density have greater effects. 
As noted by Jarosz and Stephens (1999) studies at any 
level above where recruiters are directly working to obtain 
new contracts, “provide very little assistance… at the local 
level in terms of making specific decisions regarding 
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station location and size.” The recruiting decisions that 
are acted on at the local geographic level:  
include the number and location of recruiting 
stations, the assignment of recruiters to those 
stations, the geographical configuration of each 
station’s territory, and the quota of each 
station. More importantly, models that use 
district data cannot provide estimates of the 
direct impact of the recruiting station  
(Hogan et al., 2000). 
 
To account for the direct impact of recruiting factors and 
localized economic factors this study is focused on the 
local geographic level for the Marine Corps, which is 
identified as the RSS. 
2. Recruiter Density and Cross Service Spillovers 
Each military branch of service utilizes their 
recruiter as the military resource designated to obtain 
contracts. Recruiters as resources have been identified as 
one of the, “services’ most immediately variable policy 
tools” (Warner, 1990) through the services’ ability to vary 
its total recruiting force as well as the concentration of 
its recruiting force within a local geographical area. 
Multiple studies have indicated that recruiters positively 
affect the number of contracts obtained, all else held 
constant. 
The effect recruiters have on increasing the supply of 
high quality male contracts has been reported to vary by 
service. In Warner’s (1990) study of recruiting in the 
1980’s, he reported a “10 percent increase in either the 
Army or Navy recruiter force is estimated to increase high-
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quality enlistments by about 4 percent. Jarosz and Stephens 
(1999) reported similar positive results when examining 
recruiter effects at the Zip Code level for the Navy from 
1995 to 1997. They reported a 2.0 to 2.2% increase in net 
new high quality male applicant contracts for every 10% 
increase in the Navy recruiter force. The Jarosz and 
Stephens results are lower than the results of Hogan et al. 
(2000) who found an own service, “recruiter effect implies 
an elasticity of about 0.42,” when examining data at the Zip 
Code level from 1994 to 1997. Although variation exists the 
results of adding recruiters at the local geographic level 
appears positive and significant in prior studies. 
The impact that a service’s own recruiter has on 
obtaining high quality applicant contracts is quite clear. 
The Goldhaber study (1999) reported that recruiters not only 
increase enlistment but are also a, “relatively cost 
effective means of increasing supply.” The average cost per 
high quality contract of recruiters has been estimated 
between $5,800 for the Navy (Goldhaber) and $7,500 for the 
Army (Warner). 
Previous studies have also examined the effects of 
other service recruiters operating within the same local 
geographical area. The spillover effect of multiple services 
recruiting within the same local geographical area may not 
be readily apparent as recruiting for one’s own service is 
the primary goal of a recruiter. This competitive 
environment seems to actually complement one’s own 
recruiting effort in that not all recruiter-contacted 
individuals choose to enlist and not all eligible to enlist 
individuals are directly contacted. The contact process does 
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serve to inform eligible individuals about military service 
and may stimulate interest in enlisting (Warner, 1990). 
Warner further states that all services, except for the 
Marine Corps, benefit from increases in recruiter strength 
within the other services, suggesting there is a 
complementary effect among DoD recruiters. 
This complementary effect is supported by Jarosz and 
Stephens (1999) in their research utilizing Zip Code level 
data. A 1.3% to 1.8% increase in Navy high quality male 
enlistment contracts was estimated for every 10% increase in 
the Army’s recruiting force within the same local geographic 
area. A similar result was reported by Hostetler (1998) in 
that five additional contracts written by other services 
would result in one new contract obtained by the Navy. Hogan 
et al. (2000) found similar results in that a 10% increase 
in the Navy recruiter force within the same local geographic 
area as an Army recruiting force is estimated to result in 
an 0.3% increase in Army high quality male contracts 
attained. 
3. Local Area Economic Factors 
John T. Warner’s (1990) review of recruiting programs 
of the 1980’s noted that analyses of military labor supply 
should contain two key economic factors: the civilian to 
military pay ratio and the civilian unemployment rate. These 
economic factors have been analyzed in numerous contract 
supply studies and estimated through the use of fixed 
effects. For further discussion on fixed effects refer to 
Warner’s 1990 study. In all cases higher relative pay and 
higher unemployment rates induce increased enlistments. 
Warner (1990) reported a 10 percent increase in relative pay 
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resulted in a 2% 5% increase in high quality contracts, 
depending on the service. Similar results are found when 
examining civilian unemployment rates. The Warner (1990) 
study reported estimates indicating a 10% change in the 
civilian unemployment rate results in a 4.0% to 5.5% change 
in high quality enlistments. The effect of unemployment on 
high quality enlistments was realized during a drastic 
decrease in unemployment rate found from 1983 to 1988. 
[T]he decline in the civilian unemployment rate     
from 9.5 percent in 1983 to 5.5 percent in 1988-a     
43 percent reduction- is estimated to have 
reduced high-quality enlistments by between 17 
and 24    percent. 
(Warner, 1990) 
The estimation of Navy Enlistment conducted by Hostetler 
(1998) found that when holding other variables constant a 1% 
increase in the unemployment rate resulting in a 1.7% 
increase in Navy new contract production at the Zip Code 
level. When the effects of unemployment on high quality male 
contracts were estimated in major metropolitan areas by 
Jarosz and Stephens (1999) a 10% increase in unemployment 
was estimated to produce a 2.3% to 2.5% increase in contract 
production per quarter. 
4. Population Factors 
The population of eligible enlistees is a driving 
factor in the amount of resources a service should apply 
towards obtaining high quality male contracts. In 
particular, the population of 17-24 year old male HSDG 
scoring in the AFQT category of I-IIIA should be a 
determining factor in allocating resources to local 
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geographic areas. Population densities have been examined by 
numerous studies confirming that a higher population pool 
results in a higher amount of contracts achieved. 
The Jarosz and Stephens (1999) study focused on major 
metropolitan areas and found the effect of population to be 
positive and statistically significant in all model 
specifications. The study showed a 10% increase in the high 
quality male applicant population increased Navy contracts 
by approximately 4% per quarter. Similar results were found 
by the Hostetler study that further broke the population 
down by Zip Code as well as by race. Dependent upon the 
racial identifier used the results from the Hostetler study 
estimated that a 10% increase in the target population 
results in an increase in a 3.6% to 4.2% increase in new 
contract production for the Navy. The results of these 
studies reinforce the assumption that as the population of 
high quality males increases within a local geographic area 
the amount of contracts obtained should also increase. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Various studies since the late 1970’s have attempted to 
identify those variables that best predict youth decisions 
about enlisting in the armed forces. Many variables have 
been identified that have enabled the development of 
enlistment forecasting models, such as the Navy’s Goaling 
Model, that help to predict the supply of high quality male 
enlistments each year. Such models provide a basis for 
manpower planners to determine how to distribute the limited 
available recruiting resources in order to meet the desired 
contract goal for the year. 
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Economic factors such as the unemployment rate and the 
civilian to military pay ratio are not able to be adjusted 
by manpower planners but have been shown to be statistically 
related to new contracts for a given year. Additionally, the 
population of eligible high quality male applicants within a 
geographic is not influenced by the recruiting force but 
clearly higher population densities of these individuals 
result in an increase in contracts in a given area. The 
adjustable variable of recruiters within a local geographic 
area not only has a positive impact upon the amount of 
contracts obtained but, tends to be a cost-effective method 
of obtaining new contracts in comparison to other recruiting 
tools (such as advertising). Since advertising, as a 
variable, has been shown to have statistical problems in the  
Navy’s Goaling Model, as found by Goldhaber (1999), the 
advertising variable will not be examined within this study. 
 18
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III. DATA 
The data set constructed for use in this analysis was 
formed by combining over 20 separate data files which were 
obtained in various formats from numerous sources. The 
sources of data include the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the 2000 
Census Report, the Bureau of Economic Analyses (BEA) and 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS). Three data 
files were constructed from the primary source data. 
By consolidating source data sets by geographical 
region, three primary data files were created. The first 
data file combined data identifiable by an RSS identifier. 
The second data file combined data identifiable by county 
code. The third data file constructed was a master data file 
that combined the first two data files as well as state and 
annual data. This file was used for estimating the high 
quality male enlistment supply model. 
A. RECRUITING SUB STATION DATA 
Data found in the RSS data file possessed an RSS 
identifier labeled (MUD Code). This unique identifier is 
generated by MCRC and is used to alpha-numerically identify 
each RSS. This data is sourced by MUD Code as well as a time 
identifier, using year and month. The Recruit Marketing 
Information System (RMIS) was used to gather data at the RSS 
level and was extracted in CSV form by month from October 
2002 through June 2007. All CSV formatted data was converted 
to Microsoft Office Excel (xls) files. Excel files were then 
imported into Stata 9.2 statistics/data analysis software 
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and converted to Stata files for later model development and 
regression analyses. Figure 3.1 represents the RMIS data 
merging process.  
 
Figure 3.1 RMIS Merged Data Flow Chart 
 
B. RECRUIT MARKETING INFORMATION SYSTEM (RMIS) 
As discussed in Chapter II, gathering data at the 
geographic level where the recruiter canvasses for contracts 
is important in developing an estimation model that will 
forecast high quality male applicants. For the purposes of 
this study the Recruiting Sub Station for the Marine Corps 
was identified as the desired geographic level at which to 
acquire data. To obtain RSS reported data, access to the 
Recruit Management Information System (RMIS) 4.2-web 
application version 2.0 was obtained through DMDC and Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC). RMIS serves as an Internet-
based version of the Recruit Market Network mainframe 
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system, and as such provides information that supports 
recruiting efforts in the form of Oracle data tables (RMIS 
Users Guide, 2007). Through simple query functions, data was 
extracted through the RMIS web accessible mainframe in comma 
separated value (CSV) form. 
1. Contract Data 
Due to large file size, contract data was extracted 
through RMIS in three separate files. DoD contract data 
formed two of the data files that were merged together by 
RSS identifier and a year-month time identifier. The DoD 
contract file was then merged with the USMC contracts file 
to form a single contracts file. The consolidated contract 
data file contained all high quality male applicant 
contracts signed by year and month per RSS for the Marine 
Corps from the beginning of FY03 through the third quarter 
of FY07. Additionally, other services’ high quality male 
applicant contracts signed during the same period and same 
RSS region were present in the contracts data file. The 
FY03, quarter 2 contract records were not present in the 
Marine Corps or DoD contracts files as this time period is 
not found in the DMDC RMIS record. 
2. Recruiter Data 
DoD recruiter data formed three of the data files that 
were merged together in Excel by RSS identifier and a year-
month time identifier. The DoD recruiter file was then 
merged with the USMC recruiter file to form a single 
recruiter file.  
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The recruiter data file contains the total number of 
production recruiters by year and month per RSS for the 
Marine Corps from the beginning of FY03 through third 
quarter of FY07. “The production recruiter file is monthly 
recruiter strength numbers submitted by each of the Service 
components” (RMIS Users Guide, 2007). 
The sum of Army, Navy, and Air Force production 
recruiters, recruiting over the same time period and same 
RSS region were present in the recruiters data file. The 
FY03 quarter 2 recruiters’ records were not present in the 
Marine Corps or DoD recruiter files due to this time period 
not being present in the DMDC RMIS record. As previously 
noted, FY07, quarter four data was not yet available at the 
time of data extract (Spring 2008). 
3. Civilian Youth Population Data 
Civilian youth population data was extracted through 
RMIS as a single data file sorted by MUD Code and the time 
identifier of year and month. Woods and Poole Economics, 
Inc. is the civilian firm that has been contracted by DoD to 
provide annual population estimates. The civilian youth 
population data file extracted from RMIS was based on Woods 
and Poole population estimates for 17-year old to 24-year 
old males that were high school seniors through four year 
degree holders that scored in Category I-IIIA on the AFQT. 
The data was sorted by year and month and geographically 
pooled by Marine Corps RSS using MUD Codes from the 
beginning of FY03 through the third quarter of FY07. 
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C.  COUNTY LEVEL DATA: UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Civilian unemployment rate data was obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) at the county level by 
year from 2003 through 2007. All of the data files were then 
merged together by FIPS (state and county) codes (Federal 
Information Processing Standards) and year identifier. The 
unemployment rate file was then merged with the state level 
data file after sorting by FIPS code. The common (state) 
FIPS codes facilitated the mergeing process between the 
unemployment rate and state level datasets. 
D.  STATE LEVEL DATA 
State level data was obtained for variables that could 
not be directly associated to an RSS. This level of data was 
indirectly associated to RSS level data through the use of 
FIPS (state) codes. Sources of state level data were 
obtained directly from public access websites for civilian 
wage and veteran population variables. 
1. Civilian Manufacturing Wage Data 
Civilian wage data for the 17-24 year old male 
population from 2003 through 2006 was estimated using 
manufacturing wage data obtained from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) at the state level. Due to format, wage data 
was extracted from the BLS website in four separate files, 
one for each year. All of the data files were merged 
together by FIPS codes and sorted by the year identifier. At 
the time of this research, wage data was unavailable for 
2007 and was estimated by adding the inflation rate for 2006 
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to the known 2006 state manufacturing wage. The wage file 
was then merged with the county unemployment rate file after 
sorting by FIPS code and year. 
2. Veteran Population 
“The gold standard for veteran population estimates is 
the decennial census of the population conducted by the 
Census Bureau” (Veteran’s Administration, 2000). Therefore, 
veteran population data was obtained from the Census Bureau 
website under the subtopic of 2000 Census. State level 
estimates for the calendar year 2000 veteran population were 
used for years 2003 through 2007. Veteran population data 
was merged to civilian manufacturing wage data by state and 
year.  
E.  OTHER DATA: MILITARY PAY 
Information on annual military pay was obtained for 
this analysis; however, military pay does not vary cross-
sectionally. Military pay charts were obtained for FY03 
through FY07 with the average E-1 through E-3 entry pay 
calculated for each individual year. This data was then 
merged with all remaining data files by year. 
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Figure 3.2 Final Master Data Set Merge Flow Chart 
 
F.  VARIABLE DESCRIPTION 
The condensed data file identified as the “Master 
Merged Data File” in Figure 3.2, served as the basis for 
later enlistment supply model development. Variables were 
identified and created from the condensed data file using 
Stata 9.2 and can be found in Table 3.1, the glossary of 
variables. Unique variables were formed for this analysis 
and can be identified in the glossary of variables.  
Variables containing the per capita extension are 
regular variables, such as USMC production recruiter 
population (USMC recruiters) for a set RSS and time period, 
divided by youth population for the same RSS and time 
period: 
USMC recruiters/per capita = USMC recruiters/youthpop 
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This variable is the ratio of Marine Corps recruiters 
assigned to an RSS (per month) to the population of high 
quality male applicants residing within the same RSS area 
over the same period of time. 
 
 
Table 3.1 Glossary Of Variables 
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Summary statistics were calculated from the Master 
Merge Data File and are displayed in Table 3.2. The number 
of observations per variable found within the Master Merge 
data file in Table 3.2 is based on those that successfully 
merged without error.  
 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics of Complete Data Set 
 
The large number of observations can be attributed to data 
entry observations being recorded for all FIPS codes for all 
observed fiscal year quarters. All merged observations were 
then condensed to RSS by fiscal year quarter beginning with 
quarter 1 of FY03 through quarter 3 of FY07. Summary 
statistics are displayed in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics of RSS, Fiscal Year Quarter 
Data 
 
 At the time of this research (Spring 1008), quarter 4 
FY07 was not yet available for all RMIS extracted data 
files. Due to a total of two quarters not being available 
(quarter 2 FY04 and quarter 4 FY07) and incomplete merges of 
data the files provided complete information on 10,799 total 
observations, rather than the 10,908 that were expected. 
Unemployment rate data serves as the limiting variable in 
the research. In the cases of missing observations found 
within the Master Merge Data File, the observations were 
dropped resulting in a net 10,799 total observations. It is 
this final data set that was used for the estimation of the 
Marine Corps Enlisted Supply Model for High Quality Male 
Applicants. 
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G. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The formation of the data set used in this research was 
developed from over 20 data files from various sources that 
were condensed into a single file identified as the Master 
Merge Data File. The Master Merge Data File associated like 
data by RSS and a time variable. Once all data was merged 
together, it was compressed using Stata 9.2 by RSS, year, 
and quarter. Using the limited observations variable of 
unemployment rate, a final data set consisting of 10,799 
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IV.  MODEL ESTIMATION 
This chapter discusses the model results that were 
obtained from the pooled-time series data base that was 
described in Chapter III. Although four specifications of 
the model were estimated, the primary prediction model is 
the one that includes the variables adjusted by youth 
population and accounts for fixed effects. 
A.  MODELS 
Four different model specifications were estimated. The 
different specifications were used to test the robustness of 
the effects of the key independent variables, such as Marine 
recruiters. One set of models estimates contracts per capita 
of youth population, while the second estimates total 
contracts. Within these two general models, one model 
includes dummy variables for Recruiter Sub Stations (RSS) to 
control for any fixed effects (e.g., military propensity), 
over geographic areas whereas the other excludes the RSS 
fixed effects. If an otherwise unobserved factor (e.g., 
propensity) is correlated with contract production and is 
also correlated with one of the explanatory variables, then 
the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variable 
(recruiters) will be biased. Adding fixed effects is one 
method of adjusting for this bias. 
B.  MODEL SPECIFICATIONS 
The models were specified in two general ways: (1) in 
the first specification, the dependent variable was 
enlistment contracts per capita of youth population, and 
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certain independent variables (recruiters) were adjusted for 
youth population; (2) in the second, the dependent variable 
was total enlistment contracts and youth population was used 
as an independent variable.  The first model was based on a 
common specification found in the literature, which is used 
to adjust for potential heteroscedasticity. Both models were 
run with and without the RSS fixed effects. The RSS dummies 
account for local area factors, such as military propensity, 
that are not otherwise captured by the independent 
variables. Models are specified in log-log form: 
 
Where Ni is the log of the number of high quality male 
contracts obtained, and Xi is the log of the explanatory 
variables, which include Marine recruiters, DoD recruiters, 
youth population, the unemployment rate, and the military-
to-civilian pay ratio.  The term µ represents the fixed 
effects, which are accounted for by the RSS. 
Another reason to use the log-log specification is that 
parameter estimates represent elasticities; thus, each 
coefficient is interpreted as the percentage change in high 
quality male contract production for each one percent change 
in the independent variable when all other factors are held 
constant in the model. In all cases the dependent variable 
is the log of the number of high quality male contracts that 
were obtained in each RSS area of operations during each of 
the observed 18 quarters from FY03 through FY07. The models 
produced R2 values ranging between 0.44 and 0.61, 
representing the variation in the dependent variable that 
can be explained by the independent variables. 
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C.  HYPOTHESIS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Hypothesis 
Based on previous studies and other service model 
results, the effect of the key variables on high quality 
male contract production is hypothesized to be positive. For 
example, it is expected that unemployment rates will have a 
positive effect on contract production, meaning that as 
unemployment rates increase in each local market area 
contracts also should increase. This relationship reflects 
the opportunity cost of a youth choosing military service. 
In this case, when local unemployment rates are high the 
Marine Corps provides a better employment opportunity than 
the civilian employment jobs available in a local area. 
Marine recruiters also are hypothesized to positively affect 
contract production with additional recruiters in the local 
area increasing the number of high quality contracts 
obtained, all else equal. Finally, changes in the military-
to-civilian pay ratio should also have a positive 
relationship with the number of high quality contracts. As 
military pay grows relative to civilian wages it is 
hypothesized that high quality male contracts will increase; 
conversely, when civilian pay rises relative to military pay 
the military-to-civilian pay ratio drops and contracts also 
should drop. 
2. Descriptive Statistics 
The data file used to estimate the models are based on 
quarterly contracts for 606 recruiting sub stations for 5 
years over the period 2003-2007.  This provides a data set 
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consisting of 18 total quarters for 606 sub stations, 
yielding a total of 10,799 observations. However, the number 
of observations used for the statistical models was reduced 
to 10,702 due to deletion of observations with erroneous 
data. Table 3.3 in Chapter III provided descriptive 
statistics for the variables included in the estimating 
models. 
D.  INTERPRETING MODEL RESULTS 
1. Per Capita Contract Model, with RSS Fixed Effects 
The primary model specification uses contracts per 
capita as the dependent variable. The log-log specification 
that accounts for fixed effects is the model used in various 
past studies, and serves as the primary model of this 
analysis. The results can be found in Table 4.1. Table 4.1 
omits the coefficients of the 606 RSS dummy variables to 
conserve space. However, the Appendix shows that many of the 
individual RSS dummies are statistically significant (the 
omitted RSS is 219# Hammond, LA). Full model results can be 
found in the Appendix. 
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 Table 4.1 Per Capita Contract Model, with RSS Fixed Effects 
 
 
As hypothesized, recruiter levels, the local 
unemployment rate and the military-to-civilian pay ratio all 
have positive estimated coefficients. An increase in 
estimated contract production between fiscal year quarters 1 
and quarter 3 is also noted and coincides with increased 
production levels that occur at the end of the school year 
and the peak basic training summer shipping months of fiscal 
year quarter 3.  
The coefficients of USMC recruiters, DoD recruiters, 
the unemployment rate, and the military-to-civilian pay 
ratio are all positive indicating that changes in these 
variables are positively related to high quality male 
contract production for the Marine Corps. The DoD recruiters 
and military-to-civilian pay ratio coefficients were not 
found to be statistically significant at any level less than 
10%. The DoD recruiter coefficient was significant at the 
.14 level and the military-to-civilian pay ratio coefficient 
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was found to be significant at the .12 level. The USMC 
recruiters and unemployment rate variables are statistically 
significant at a level greater than 1% as indicated by their 
respective p-values. 
The coefficient of Marine recruiters indicates that a 
10% increase in Marine recruiters is estimated to increase 
high quality male contract production by 8.62%. Similarly 
the same 10% change in unemployment rate would increase high 
quality male contract production by 0.32%. At the mean level 
of the unemployment rate in this data (approximately 5%) an 
increase in the unemployment rate by 1 point (about 20%) 
would increase high quality male contracts by nearly 1%. 
The coefficient of the military-to-civilian pay 
variable indicates that a 10% increase in military pay will 
increase enlistments by 10% (although the coefficient is 
only marginally significant at the .12 level). Although the 
magnitude of change in contract production that can be 
expected by closing the military-civilian pay gap exceeds 
that of the estimated effect of increasing Marine recruiter 
levels, it is important to note that recruiter levels can be 
adjusted within the Marine Corps while changes in pay 
require congressional and DoD approval. Thus, changing pay 
is a much less flexible policy option to increase production 
levels. The variation in high quality male contracts that 
can be explained by the model in Table 4.1 is 60.6% as 
indicated by an R-squared of 0.606. 
2. Per Capita Contract Model, without RSS Fixed 
Effects 
While the specification in Table 4.1 is the preferred 
specification because it mirrors the model found in the 
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previous literature, several variants of this basic model 
were run to test the robustness of the key coefficients. 
Table 4.2 shows the results from estimating the basic model 
but omitting the RSS fixed effects (year and fiscal year 
quarter dummies, however, are included in the model). As 
discussed above, this model may generate biased coefficients 
by omitting geographic-based fixed effects. 
 Table 4.2 Per Capita Contract Model, without RSS Fixed 
Effects 
 
The results show that the USMC recruiter, DoD 
recruiter, the unemployment rate and the military-to-
civilian pay ratio coefficients are all estimated to be 
positive. Additionally, both USMC recruiter and DoD 
recruiter variables are statistically significant at less 
than the 1% level while the unemployment rate and the 
military-to-civilian pay ratio are statistically significant 




compared to Table 4.1, in Table 4.2 the unemployment rate 
variable became insignificant whereas the DoD recruiters 
variable became significant. 
The USMC recruiters and DoD recruiter estimated effects 
on contract production are very similar to the estimated 
effects that are found in the primary model in Table 4.1, 
but the DoD recruiters variable is now statistically 
significant at the .01 level. For example, a 10% increase 
USMC recruiters is estimated to increase high quality male 
contracts by 8.79% in Table 4.2 versus the 8.62% found in 
the primary model results of Table 4.1. DoD recruiters still 
has a complimentary relationship with Marine contracts—a 10% 
increase in DoD recruiters at the RSS level increases Marine 
contract production at the RSS by 3.1%. The same fiscal year 
trend is noted, with an estimated increase in high quality 
male contract production occurring in quarter 3. The 
estimated effects of the unemployment rate and the military-
to-civilian pay variable are far less than the estimated 
effects found in the primary model. The coefficient of the 
pay variable dropped to only .068, but is still 
statistically insignificant. It is worth noting that the 
model in Table 4.2 R2 drops to .50 from about .60 in the 
model in Table 4.1. This is due to dropping the large number 
of RSS dummies from the model. 
3. Total Contracts Model, with RSS Fixed Effects 
A third log-log model was estimated where the dependent 
variable was total quarterly RSS contracts (versus per 
capita contracts in Tables 4.1 and 4.2). In this model youth 
population was entered in the model to control for size of 
the local market area. Table 4.3 presents the results. 
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 Table 4.3 Total Contracts Model, with RSS Fixed Effects 
 
The coefficients of Marine recruiters, the unemployment 
rate and the military-to-civilian pay ratio are again found 
to have positive coefficients. The estimated effect of 
Marine recruiters on contract production is nearly identical 
to that found in the primary model in Table 4.1. Unlike 
previous models, the estimated coefficient of the military-
to-civilian pay variable is implausibly large and not 
statistically significant at less than the .10 level. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the unemployment rate variable 
is positive but has increased in size compared to the 
unemployment coefficient estimated in Table 4.1, .20 
versus.03. The same progressive increase in quarter dummy 
coefficients is again noted and coincides with increased 
recruiter production levels that are expected in the third 
quarter. 
Other DoD recruiters are estimated to have a slight 
negative impact on recruiter production in this 
specification of the model but as indicated by the p-value 
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the coefficient is not statistically significant at less 
than the 10% level. The coefficient of the military-to-
civilian pay ratio is found to be extremely large, as in 
Table 4.1, but it is not statistically significant. 
Additionally, youth population is estimated to be negatively 
and significantly associated with production. 
Although the negative coefficient on the youth 
population variable appears counterintuitive to what is 
expected it may be explained as a function of the number of 
recruiters relative to the total youth population. As the 
population of youth increases, but the number of USMC 
recruiters is held constant, the ability of a fixed number 
of recruiters to canvass this larger population declines. 
Mission may still be met by recruiters but a segment of the 
population is not canvassed and, therefore, potential 
applicants are not contracted. The number of total high 
quality male production that can be explained by the model 
results found in Table 4.2 is 57.91% as indicated by an R-
squared of 0.5791. 
4. Total Contracts Model, without RSS Fixed Effects 
The final model variant simply removes RSS fixed 
effects from the model in Table 4.3. The results of this 
model are presented in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Total Contracts Model, without RSS Fixed Effects 
 
The USMC recruiter, DoD recruiter, unemployment rate 
and military-to-civilian pay variables are all estimated to 
have positive effects on high quality male contract 
production. The effect of USMC recruiters on contract 
production is very similar to the model results presented in 
Table 4.3. A 10% increase in USMC recruiters is estimated to 
produce 8.89% more high quality male applicants in Table 
4.4, compared to Table 4.3 where the same USMC recruiter 
increase is estimated to produce 8.63% more high quality 
male contracts. 
In contrast to the DoD recruiters coefficient estimated 
in Table 4.3, the results of Table 4.4 are similar to those 
of the primary model in Table 4.1. The model in Table 4.4 
estimates a 10% increase in other DoD recruiters will 
produce 0.20% more high quality male Marine contracts. The 
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DoD recruiter variable is marginally significant at the .105 
level. These findings are similar to the primary model, 
presented in Table 4.1, that estimates the same increase in 
other DoD recruiter levels will result in a 0.34% increase 
in USMC high quality male contracts. Again, the coefficient 
of the DoD recruiters variable reaffirms a cooperative, not 
competitive, situation among service recruiters. 
The estimated negative effects of youth population on 
contract production are similar to the results in Table 4.3 
and as previously discussed, can be explained in the same 
manner. However, the youth population variable is not 
statistically significant. The military-to-civilian pay 
ratio is also statistically insignificant, although its 
magnitude is similar to previous findings (Warner, 1990). 
The size of the military-to-civilian pay ratio is 
significantly reduced from the estimated effects of Table 
4.3 and is about half that of the results in the primary 
model found in Table 4.1. 
5. Summary of Recruiter Effects 
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of the estimated 
effects of Marine recruiters, as represented by the USMC 
recruiters variable, on high quality male contracts in the 
four different model specifications. Of all variables 
included in each model specification, the Marine recruiters 
variable had the largest elasticity and was significant at 
the 1% level in all models specified, Table 4.1 through 
Table 4.4.  
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Table 4.5 Summary of Effects of Marine Recruiters 
(* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%) 
 
The estimated elasticity of Marine recruiters’ ranges 
between .86 and .89. In the primary model in Table 4.1 a 10% 
increase in Marine recruiters in a local area increases high 
quality male contracts by 8.6%. This elasticity is four 
times that of Navy recruiters at the Navy RSS-equivalent 
(station) level (Jarosz and Stephens, 1999). The effect of 
Navy recruiters located at Navy Recruiting Stations in the 
1999 Jarosz and Stephens study was based on an average of 
1,100 Navy recruiting stations, virtually twice as many 
Marine RSS equivalents. The concentration of Marine 
recruiters into fewer recruiting locations might be the 
reason that the effect of recruiters is larger in the Marine 
Corps. 
The estimated Marine recruiter elasticity also exceeds 
those found in the 2000 Hogan et al. study, which reported 
an Army recruiter elasticity of 0.42, about half that in 
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this study. Similar to the 2000 Hogan et al. study, the 1990 
Warner study reported an elasticity of Marine recruiters on 
high quality male contracts to be 0.48, the 1990 Warner 
study results are presented in Table 4.5 in the “Other 
Studies” column. Warner did note that a services’ recruiter 
force was an important policy tool for varying high quality 
enlistment contracts and that the Marine Corps results in 
his model were sensitive to including a time trend. In 
addition, Warner’s study was based on RS-equivalent level 
data as well as annual totals for service. Present Marine 
Corps policy changes related to the “grow the force” 
initiatives and an increasing recruiter force size may be 
reflected in the large elasticity found in this study, 
assuming the number of facilities has not grown 
proportionately. 
6. Summary of Unemployment Rate Effects 
Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the unemployment 
rate on high quality male contracts.  The unemployment rate 
was found to be significant at the 1% level in all models 
estimated with RSS fixed effects. 
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Table 4.6 Summary of Effects of the Unemployment Rate 
(* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%) 
 
The estimated elasticity of the unemployment rate ranged 
from 0.005 to 0.21 in the specifications of all the models 
run. The primary model results, presented in Table 4.1, find 
that a 10% change in the unemployment rate would result in a 
0.32% increase in high quality male contracts. This range in 
elasticity is commensurate with the results of past studies, 
particularly those studies utilizing variables based on per 
capita youth population and accounting for fixed effects. 
The results of the Jarosz and Stephens (1999) are reported 
in the “Other Studies” column of Table 4.6. Jarosz and 
Stephens (1999) found the unemployment rate to be “positive 
and statistically significant with an elasticity of 0.04” in 
model estimates based on RSS-equivelant data. This is a 
difference of less than one-tenth of a percentage point of 
the estimate in the primary model of this thesis (per capita 
with fixed effects) estimated in this study.  
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7. Summary of Military-to-Civilian Pay Effects 
The military-to-civilian pay ratio coefficient was not 
statistically significant at less than the .12 level in any 
variants of the primary model but was always positive. As 
seen in Table 4.7, the elasticity from the primary model in 
Table 4.1 indicates a 10% change in the military to civilian 
pay ratio would result in a 10.08% change in high quality 
male contracts. 
 Table 4.7 Summary of Effects of the Military-to-Civilian 
Pay Ratio 
(* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%) 
 
 
Warner’s (1990) report estimated a 10% change in 
relative pay equates to a 5% to 25% change in high quality 
enlistments, dependent upon branch of service. The results 
found in this thesis are clearly within this range but are 
found to be less than the 25% for the Marine Corps that 
Warner’s study found. 
 47
8. Summary of Other DoD Recruiter Effects 
Table 4.8 displays the effects of non-Marine Corps 
recruiters on Marine recruiting. The coefficients of other 
service recruiters finds that a 10% change in other service 
recruiters results in a -.05% to 0.34% increase in Marine 
high quality male contract production depending on model 
specification. Of the four models specified, only those 
modes including RSS fixed effects were found to be 
statistically significant at the 10% level or better. 
 
 Table 4.8 Summary of Other DoD Recruiters Effects 
(* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%) 
 
 
Although the estimated  effect is small it supports the 
findings of other studies (Jarosz and Stephens, 1999; 
Warner, 1990; Hogan et al, 2000) that a cooperative effect 
of services recruiting within the same area is present 
rather than a competitive effect as may be expected. For 
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example, Jarosz and Stephens (1999) reported a 10% increase 
in Army recruiters operating within the same local market 
increases Navy high quality male contract production by 2% 
to 3.2%. Hogan et al.(2000) reported a 10% increase in Navy 
recruiters operating in the same zip code as an Army 
recruiting station increased Army high quality male contract 
production by 0.3%. Both of these studies support the 
concept of complimentary efforts among recruiters of various 
branches of service. The positive effects of Army recruiter 
levels on Navy contracts produced may be explained by the 
Navy serving as an alternative service for those who desire 
to enlist but would prefer to be removed from what is 
perceived as a front line infantry service. If the Navy 
serves as an alternative to the Army for service selection 
but not vice versa then the elasticity found within this 
study is identical to that of the Hogan et al. (2000) study.  
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, it appears that the effects of Marine 
recruiters are robust to the alternative specifications. The 
effects of some of the other variables, however, appear to 
be sensitive to model specification. In particular, the 
effects of the local unemployment rate and the military-to-
civilian pay variable were highly sensitive to the 
particular model specification. 
Four primary specifications of the basic enlistment 
supply model were estimated in this thesis. The estimated 
effects of the unemployment rate, military-to-civilian pay 
ratio and other service recruiters were found to be 
commensurate with the findings of past studies. The results 
of Marine recruiters on high quality male contract 
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production were estimated to be nearly twice those of 
studies examining other service recruiters. It is possible 
that these results reflect the smaller number of Marine 
Recruiting Sub Stations in comparison to the total number of 
stations maintained by other services. The concentration of 
recruiting efforts while still setting goaling levels 
similar to other services may have resulted in each Marine 
recruiter having a larger increased effect on Marine high 
quality male contact production. Full Fixed Effects results 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 This chapter provides a summary of research findings in 
this thesis and compares these results to those in the prior 
literature on enlistment supply models. Additionally, 
strengths and weaknesses of the model developed in this 
thesis are reviewed. Suggested model implementation by 
Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) and follow on 
research recommendations are also introduced. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
 In this thesis I estimated high quality male contract 
supply models for the Marine Corps on data disaggregated to 
the Recruiting Sub Station level. Model estimations were 
based on data covering 18 fiscal year quarters from 2003 
through 2007, which yielded 10,799 observations.  The model 
specifications used a log-log functional form and stressed 
the fixed effects estimates. The effects of local economic 
factors, local area demographics, and the allocation of 
recruiting resources (in the form of recruiters) on high 
quality male contract production were analyzed. 
The primary model results were in line with 
expectations with coefficients that, in most cases, were 
similar to those from prior studies reviewed in the 
literature review chapter. The unemployment rate and own-
service recruiter variables were generally statistically 
significant and, in particular, the estimated unemployment 
rate coefficient was very similar to that found in prior 
studies which used data at a local market level (Jarosz and 
Stephens, 1999). A noticeable increase in contract 
production is estimated from the first to the third quarter 
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of the fiscal year and is as expected based on shipping 
cycles for basic training. The own-service recruiter 
variable (USMC recruiter) had an estimated coefficient that 
was at least twice the size of that variable in previous 
studies (Warner, 1990). This variation may be explained by 
the fact that Marine recruiters tend to be concentrated in 
fewer recruiting facilities (Recruiting Sub Stations) than 
the other services, but must maintain a high new contract 
production quota. 
 The effect of the military-to-civilian pay ratio was 
positive as expected, based on the findings of previous 
studies (Warner, 1990), but the coefficient was only weakly 
significant (at the .12 level). Furthermore, the other-
service recruiter variable (DoD recruiter) had a positive 
coefficient in the primary model, suggesting that the effect 
of other DoD recruiters working in the same local market 
area was complimentary, a result that also has been found in 
prior studies (Hogan et al., 2000). 
 In reviewing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
primary model developed for this research it is important to 
note that no previous model existed for the Marine Corps. As 
such, this research provides a baseline for future studies. 
The data set established for this base of research is very 
extensive, covering 18 quarters over a five-year period. 
Additionally, the data is disaggregated to the local market 
level, with the exception of civilian wages and the veteran 
population. The estimated coefficients of many of the 
independent variables lie within the range of findings from 
previous studies (Warner, 1990; Jarosz and Stephens, 1999; 
Hogan et al., 2000). 
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 A key weakness of the model lies within the limited 
initial pool of variables that were readily available. An 
example is the inability of the model to capture a variable 
that accurately represents the propensity of youth to 
enlist. In addition, the veteran population variable was 
based on 2000 Census data and thus had no variation over 
time and had to be dropped from the model. Additionally, the 
civilian youth wage variable was based on state level 
manufacturing wages. Unfortunately, the manufacturing wage 
is based on the average salary of all workers within the 
manufacturing industry for a given state, not just the entry 
level manufacturing worker. Utilizing the state level 
manufacturing wage as a proxy for the civilian youth wage 
likely overestimates the opportunity wages available to the 
targeted youth population. Another problem is that the model 
in its current form is not readily usable by MCRC and would 
require an analyst with some form of regression analysis 
understanding to update, maintain, and interpret the models 
results for future use. 
 Despite these weaknesses, there are still potentially 
beneficial uses of the model for the Marine Corps. The model 
can be used to predict high quality male contract production 
when local market factors affecting Recruiter Sub Station 
production change. Coefficient estimates on the unemployment 
rate produced by the model were in the range found in prior 
studies that examined the same local market level (Jarosz 
and Stephens, 1999). As unemployment rates over time adjust 
the expected contract production level for given Recruiting 
Sub Stations can also be adjusted to establish local 
recruitment goals that are adjusted for the local economy. 
The model can also be used as a tool to examine whether 
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accurate contract levels are being assigned to Regions, 
Districts, Recruiting Stations, and Recruiting Sub Stations 
based on model estimates of contract production levels.  
 As a resource allocation tool the model can be used to 
determine local area effects of adjusting recruiter levels. 
This process would enable MCRC to target limited recruiting 
assets to regions that are predicted to produce more high 
quality male contracts in the future, therefore maximizing 
production per recruiter levels. As additional variables are 
added to the model their estimated effects could be used in 
a similar fashion to target resources to high yield regions 
or reallocate resources throughout the Marine Corps 
recruiting regions. A cost-effectiveness analysis of various 
recruitment resources can also be derived from the model 
assisting with decisions involving resource investment. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Enhancing the model developed in this study by adding 
relevant predictors of contract production variables found 
in other prior studies, would enable a more accurate 
estimation of high quality male contract production at the 
Recruiting Sub Station level for the Marine Corps. 
Establishing a more accurate youth wage estimator would 
benefit the model and likely provide a better estimate of 
changes to the military-to civilian wage variable. As 
military service may be the first full time job that many 
youth enlisting in service have ever had, the use of median 
family income by county may serve as a more accurate 
estimator of civilian wages than the manufacturing wage. 
Such a variable may also serve a secondary benefit of  
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providing an indication of the economic background of those 
who are likely to enlist and enable marketing resources to 
be distributed accordingly. 
Further breakdown of existing variables such as by age 
and race of the male population also may provide additional 
insight into local demographics that may be beneficial in 
assigning contract goals to the Recruiting Station and 
Recruiting Sub Station levels.  Additionally, conducting a 
cost-effectiveness analysis to determine which resources 
provide the most new contract production per dollar has 
great benefit in budget decisions concerning recruitment 
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APPENDIX  
Source SS df MS Number of obs = 10702.0000 
        F(611, 10090) = 25.3900 
Model 78.8384 611.0000 0.1290 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual 51.2808 10090.0000 0.0051 R-squared = 0.6059 
        Adj R-squared = 0.5820 
Total 130.1192 10701.0000 0.0122 Root MSE = 0.0713 
       
log_USMC male contracts/per capita Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
log_USMC recruiter/per capita 0.8626 0.0152 56.7000 0.0000 0.8328 0.8924 
log_DoD recruiter/per capita 0.0336 0.0231 1.4600 0.1460 -0.0117 0.0788 
log_ur 0.0324 0.0079 4.0800 0.0000 0.0168 0.0479 
log_milciv pay ratio 1.0080 0.6490 1.5500 0.1200 -0.2641 2.2801 
_IRSS_2 -0.0936 0.0241 -3.8900 0.0000 -0.1408 -0.0465 
_IRSS_3 -0.0609 0.0249 -2.4500 0.0140 -0.1096 -0.0121 
_IRSS_4 -0.0796 0.0269 -2.9600 0.0030 -0.1323 -0.0270 
_IRSS_5 -0.0502 0.0242 -2.0700 0.0390 -0.0977 -0.0026 
_IRSS_6 -0.0385 0.0259 -1.4800 0.1380 -0.0893 0.0123 
_IRSS_7 -0.0864 0.0306 -2.8200 0.0050 -0.1464 -0.0263 
_IRSS_8 -0.0581 0.0306 -1.9000 0.0580 -0.1181 0.0020 
_IRSS_9 -0.1054 0.0263 -4.0100 0.0000 -0.1570 -0.0538 
_IRSS_10 -0.0397 0.0275 -1.4500 0.1480 -0.0935 0.0141 
_IRSS_11 -0.0770 0.0257 -3.0000 0.0030 -0.1274 -0.0267 
_IRSS_12 -0.0238 0.0281 -0.8500 0.3970 -0.0790 0.0313 
_IRSS_13 -0.0385 0.0242 -1.5900 0.1120 -0.0861 0.0090 
_IRSS_14 -0.0323 0.0241 -1.3400 0.1800 -0.0795 0.0150 
_IRSS_15 -0.0079 0.0257 -0.3100 0.7590 -0.0584 0.0426 
_IRSS_16 -0.0378 0.0372 -1.0200 0.3100 -0.1107 0.0351 
_IRSS_17 -0.0331 0.0247 -1.3400 0.1800 -0.0815 0.0153 
_IRSS_18 -0.0500 0.0275 -1.8100 0.0700 -0.1040 0.0040 
_IRSS_19 -0.0393 0.0282 -1.3900 0.1650 -0.0946 0.0161 
_IRSS_20 -0.0624 0.0264 -2.3600 0.0180 -0.1141 -0.0107 
_IRSS_21 -0.0656 0.0269 -2.4400 0.0150 -0.1182 -0.0129 
_IRSS_22 -0.0372 0.0249 -1.5000 0.1350 -0.0860 0.0115 
_IRSS_23 0.0087 0.0246 0.3500 0.7230 -0.0394 0.0569 
_IRSS_24 -0.0185 0.0268 -0.6900 0.4910 -0.0710 0.0341 
_IRSS_25 -0.0194 0.0291 -0.6700 0.5030 -0.0764 0.0375 
_IRSS_26 -0.0894 0.0258 -3.4600 0.0010 -0.1401 -0.0388 
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_IRSS_27 -0.0332 0.0270 -1.2300 0.2180 -0.0861 0.0196 
_IRSS_28 -0.0433 0.0253 -1.7100 0.0870 -0.0930 0.0063 
_IRSS_29 -0.0130 0.0246 -0.5300 0.5960 -0.0612 0.0351 
_IRSS_30 0.0135 0.0244 0.5500 0.5810 -0.0343 0.0612 
_IRSS_31 -0.0395 0.0257 -1.5400 0.1250 -0.0900 0.0109 
_IRSS_32 -0.0542 0.0252 -2.1500 0.0320 -0.1037 -0.0047 
_IRSS_33 -0.0657 0.0301 -2.1900 0.0290 -0.1247 -0.0068 
_IRSS_34 -0.0477 0.0248 -1.9200 0.0550 -0.0963 0.0009 
_IRSS_35 -0.0345 0.0246 -1.4100 0.1600 -0.0827 0.0136 
_IRSS_36 -0.0371 0.0266 -1.3900 0.1630 -0.0893 0.0151 
_IRSS_37 0.0011 0.0244 0.0500 0.9630 -0.0467 0.0490 
_IRSS_38 -0.0223 0.0247 -0.9000 0.3680 -0.0708 0.0262 
_IRSS_39 -0.0941 0.0258 -3.6500 0.0000 -0.1448 -0.0435 
_IRSS_40 -0.0212 0.0251 -0.8500 0.3980 -0.0704 0.0280 
_IRSS_41 -0.0537 0.0241 -2.2300 0.0260 -0.1010 -0.0065 
_IRSS_42 0.0017 0.0262 0.0700 0.9470 -0.0495 0.0530 
_IRSS_43 -0.0376 0.0245 -1.5300 0.1250 -0.0857 0.0105 
_IRSS_44 -0.0184 0.0282 -0.6500 0.5140 -0.0737 0.0369 
_IRSS_45 -0.0480 0.0273 -1.7600 0.0790 -0.1015 0.0055 
_IRSS_46 -0.0398 0.0255 -1.5600 0.1190 -0.0899 0.0102 
_IRSS_47 -0.0535 0.0369 -1.4500 0.1470 -0.1258 0.0189 
_IRSS_48 -0.0680 0.0242 -2.8100 0.0050 -0.1154 -0.0206 
_IRSS_49 -0.0470 0.0282 -1.6700 0.0950 -0.1022 0.0082 
_IRSS_50 -0.0357 0.0322 -1.1100 0.2680 -0.0989 0.0275 
_IRSS_51 -0.0569 0.0269 -2.1200 0.0340 -0.1096 -0.0042 
_IRSS_52 -0.0218 0.0252 -0.8700 0.3860 -0.0711 0.0275 
_IRSS_53 -0.0344 0.0247 -1.3900 0.1640 -0.0828 0.0140 
_IRSS_54 -0.0147 0.0248 -0.5900 0.5530 -0.0632 0.0339 
_IRSS_55 -0.0315 0.0289 -1.0900 0.2750 -0.0881 0.0251 
_IRSS_56 -0.0472 0.0261 -1.8100 0.0700 -0.0984 0.0039 
_IRSS_57 -0.1007 0.0255 -3.9500 0.0000 -0.1506 -0.0507 
_IRSS_58 -0.0101 0.0271 -0.3700 0.7090 -0.0632 0.0430 
_IRSS_59 -0.0385 0.0277 -1.3900 0.1640 -0.0928 0.0157 
_IRSS_60 -0.0694 0.0269 -2.5800 0.0100 -0.1221 -0.0168 
_IRSS_61 -0.0558 0.0269 -2.0800 0.0380 -0.1085 -0.0031 
_IRSS_62 0.0137 0.0265 0.5200 0.6060 -0.0383 0.0657 
_IRSS_63 -0.0368 0.0266 -1.3800 0.1670 -0.0890 0.0154 
_IRSS_64 -0.0875 0.0261 -3.3600 0.0010 -0.1385 -0.0364 
_IRSS_65 -0.0863 0.0270 -3.1900 0.0010 -0.1393 -0.0334 
_IRSS_66 -0.0421 0.0261 -1.6100 0.1070 -0.0934 0.0091 
 59
_IRSS_67 0.0154 0.0269 0.5700 0.5670 -0.0373 0.0681 
_IRSS_68 -0.0335 0.0260 -1.2900 0.1980 -0.0844 0.0175 
_IRSS_69 -0.0980 0.0251 -3.9100 0.0000 -0.1472 -0.0489 
_IRSS_70 -0.0155 0.0241 -0.6400 0.5220 -0.0628 0.0319 
_IRSS_71 -0.0567 0.0281 -2.0200 0.0430 -0.1117 -0.0017 
_IRSS_72 0.1068 0.0265 4.0300 0.0000 0.0549 0.1588 
_IRSS_73 -0.0708 0.0261 -2.7200 0.0070 -0.1219 -0.0197 
_IRSS_74 -0.0402 0.0262 -1.5300 0.1250 -0.0916 0.0112 
_IRSS_75 -0.0667 0.0241 -2.7700 0.0060 -0.1139 -0.0195 
_IRSS_76 -0.0428 0.0256 -1.6700 0.0950 -0.0930 0.0074 
_IRSS_77 -0.0887 0.0280 -3.1600 0.0020 -0.1437 -0.0337 
_IRSS_78 -0.0237 0.0328 -0.7200 0.4690 -0.0879 0.0405 
_IRSS_79 -0.0449 0.0255 -1.7600 0.0780 -0.0948 0.0050 
_IRSS_80 -0.0700 0.0266 -2.6300 0.0090 -0.1221 -0.0178 
_IRSS_81 -0.0475 0.0265 -1.7900 0.0740 -0.0995 0.0045 
_IRSS_82 -0.0265 0.0257 -1.0300 0.3030 -0.0769 0.0239 
_IRSS_83 -0.0856 0.0279 -3.0600 0.0020 -0.1404 -0.0308 
_IRSS_84 -0.0396 0.0254 -1.5600 0.1190 -0.0893 0.0101 
_IRSS_85 -0.0399 0.0241 -1.6500 0.0980 -0.0872 0.0074 
_IRSS_86 -0.0145 0.0248 -0.5800 0.5590 -0.0632 0.0341 
_IRSS_87 0.0065 0.0280 0.2300 0.8150 -0.0483 0.0614 
_IRSS_88 -0.0544 0.0242 -2.2500 0.0250 -0.1017 -0.0070 
_IRSS_89 -0.0457 0.0279 -1.6400 0.1010 -0.1004 0.0090 
_IRSS_90 -0.0425 0.0278 -1.5300 0.1260 -0.0969 0.0119 
_IRSS_91 -0.0435 0.0268 -1.6300 0.1040 -0.0960 0.0089 
_IRSS_92 -0.1870 0.0279 -6.7100 0.0000 -0.2416 -0.1323 
_IRSS_93 -0.1451 0.0341 -4.2600 0.0000 -0.2119 -0.0783 
_IRSS_94 -0.0149 0.0245 -0.6100 0.5440 -0.0628 0.0331 
_IRSS_95 -0.0915 0.0254 -3.6000 0.0000 -0.1413 -0.0418 
_IRSS_96 -0.0287 0.0251 -1.1400 0.2540 -0.0779 0.0206 
_IRSS_97 -0.0573 0.0247 -2.3200 0.0200 -0.1058 -0.0089 
_IRSS_98 0.0229 0.0253 0.9000 0.3660 -0.0268 0.0725 
_IRSS_99 -0.0469 0.0248 -1.8900 0.0580 -0.0955 0.0017 
_IRSS_100 -0.0176 0.0256 -0.6900 0.4910 -0.0678 0.0326 
_IRSS_101 -0.0767 0.0252 -3.0500 0.0020 -0.1260 -0.0273 
_IRSS_102 -0.0512 0.0264 -1.9400 0.0520 -0.1030 0.0005 
_IRSS_103 -0.0362 0.0279 -1.3000 0.1950 -0.0910 0.0185 
_IRSS_104 -0.0549 0.0262 -2.1000 0.0360 -0.1061 -0.0036 
_IRSS_105 -0.0420 0.0258 -1.6300 0.1030 -0.0925 0.0085 
_IRSS_106 -0.0117 0.0273 -0.4300 0.6680 -0.0653 0.0418 
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_IRSS_107 -0.0892 0.0283 -3.1500 0.0020 -0.1447 -0.0337 
_IRSS_108 0.0195 0.0247 0.7900 0.4290 -0.0288 0.0679 
_IRSS_109 0.0155 0.0239 0.6500 0.5190 -0.0315 0.0624 
_IRSS_110 -0.0657 0.0253 -2.6000 0.0090 -0.1153 -0.0161 
_IRSS_111 -0.0962 0.0270 -3.5500 0.0000 -0.1492 -0.0431 
_IRSS_112 -0.0637 0.0268 -2.3700 0.0180 -0.1163 -0.0111 
_IRSS_113 -0.0378 0.0243 -1.5500 0.1200 -0.0855 0.0099 
_IRSS_114 -0.0782 0.0276 -2.8300 0.0050 -0.1324 -0.0240 
_IRSS_115 -0.0087 0.0263 -0.3300 0.7420 -0.0603 0.0430 
_IRSS_116 -0.0682 0.0257 -2.6500 0.0080 -0.1186 -0.0178 
_IRSS_117 -0.0463 0.0269 -1.7200 0.0850 -0.0990 0.0064 
_IRSS_118 -0.0372 0.0245 -1.5200 0.1290 -0.0853 0.0109 
_IRSS_119 -0.0367 0.0241 -1.5300 0.1270 -0.0840 0.0105 
_IRSS_120 -0.0283 0.0262 -1.0800 0.2800 -0.0797 0.0231 
_IRSS_121 -0.0322 0.0257 -1.2600 0.2090 -0.0826 0.0181 
_IRSS_122 -0.1105 0.0265 -4.1600 0.0000 -0.1626 -0.0585 
_IRSS_123 -0.0252 0.0252 -1.0000 0.3180 -0.0745 0.0242 
_IRSS_124 -0.0446 0.0245 -1.8200 0.0680 -0.0927 0.0034 
_IRSS_125 -0.1073 0.0272 -3.9400 0.0000 -0.1606 -0.0540 
_IRSS_126 -0.0430 0.0248 -1.7300 0.0840 -0.0917 0.0057 
_IRSS_127 -0.0128 0.0272 -0.4700 0.6390 -0.0662 0.0406 
_IRSS_128 -0.0927 0.0264 -3.5200 0.0000 -0.1443 -0.0410 
_IRSS_129 -0.0995 0.0285 -3.4900 0.0000 -0.1555 -0.0436 
_IRSS_130 -0.0323 0.0253 -1.2700 0.2020 -0.0819 0.0173 
_IRSS_131 -0.0007 0.0246 -0.0300 0.9770 -0.0489 0.0475 
_IRSS_132 -0.0509 0.0260 -1.9600 0.0500 -0.1019 0.0001 
_IRSS_133 -0.0800 0.0265 -3.0200 0.0030 -0.1319 -0.0280 
_IRSS_134 -0.0578 0.0288 -2.0100 0.0450 -0.1142 -0.0013 
_IRSS_135 -0.1595 0.0253 -6.3100 0.0000 -0.2090 -0.1099 
_IRSS_136 0.0024 0.0266 0.0900 0.9290 -0.0497 0.0545 
_IRSS_137 -0.0698 0.0277 -2.5200 0.0120 -0.1240 -0.0155 
_IRSS_138 -0.0442 0.0286 -1.5500 0.1220 -0.1002 0.0118 
_IRSS_139 -0.0389 0.0276 -1.4100 0.1580 -0.0929 0.0152 
_IRSS_140 -0.0709 0.0247 -2.8700 0.0040 -0.1193 -0.0225 
_IRSS_141 -0.0279 0.0245 -1.1400 0.2550 -0.0759 0.0201 
_IRSS_142 -0.0866 0.0251 -3.4500 0.0010 -0.1358 -0.0374 
_IRSS_143 -0.0988 0.0268 -3.6900 0.0000 -0.1513 -0.0463 
_IRSS_144 -0.0053 0.0281 -0.1900 0.8490 -0.0603 0.0497 
_IRSS_145 -0.0779 0.0244 -3.1900 0.0010 -0.1257 -0.0300 
_IRSS_146 -0.0442 0.0251 -1.7600 0.0790 -0.0934 0.0050 
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_IRSS_147 0.0062 0.0264 0.2300 0.8150 -0.0456 0.0580 
_IRSS_148 -0.0687 0.0270 -2.5400 0.0110 -0.1217 -0.0157 
_IRSS_149 -0.0912 0.0253 -3.6000 0.0000 -0.1408 -0.0416 
_IRSS_150 -0.0491 0.0251 -1.9500 0.0510 -0.0984 0.0002 
_IRSS_151 -0.0348 0.0246 -1.4200 0.1570 -0.0830 0.0134 
_IRSS_152 -0.0817 0.0247 -3.3100 0.0010 -0.1301 -0.0334 
_IRSS_153 -0.0064 0.0264 -0.2400 0.8090 -0.0582 0.0454 
_IRSS_154 -0.0228 0.0312 -0.7300 0.4650 -0.0838 0.0383 
_IRSS_155 -0.0089 0.0241 -0.3700 0.7130 -0.0562 0.0384 
_IRSS_156 -0.0362 0.0258 -1.4000 0.1600 -0.0867 0.0143 
_IRSS_157 -0.0395 0.0249 -1.5900 0.1120 -0.0882 0.0092 
_IRSS_158 -0.0374 0.0245 -1.5300 0.1270 -0.0854 0.0106 
_IRSS_159 -0.0643 0.0251 -2.5600 0.0100 -0.1136 -0.0151 
_IRSS_160 -0.0597 0.0260 -2.2900 0.0220 -0.1108 -0.0087 
_IRSS_161 -0.0343 0.0260 -1.3200 0.1870 -0.0852 0.0166 
_IRSS_162 -0.0164 0.0257 -0.6400 0.5240 -0.0668 0.0340 
_IRSS_163 -0.0812 0.0296 -2.7400 0.0060 -0.1391 -0.0232 
_IRSS_164 -0.0116 0.0253 -0.4600 0.6480 -0.0612 0.0381 
_IRSS_165 -0.0472 0.0259 -1.8200 0.0690 -0.0980 0.0036 
_IRSS_166 -0.0784 0.0259 -3.0300 0.0020 -0.1291 -0.0277 
_IRSS_167 -0.0367 0.0251 -1.4700 0.1430 -0.0859 0.0124 
_IRSS_168 -0.0476 0.0270 -1.7600 0.0780 -0.1004 0.0053 
_IRSS_169 -0.0225 0.0249 -0.9000 0.3660 -0.0713 0.0263 
_IRSS_170 -0.0134 0.0251 -0.5300 0.5930 -0.0626 0.0358 
_IRSS_171 -0.0302 0.0257 -1.1800 0.2390 -0.0805 0.0201 
_IRSS_172 -0.1416 0.0276 -5.1300 0.0000 -0.1956 -0.0875 
_IRSS_174 -0.1624 0.0281 -5.7800 0.0000 -0.2175 -0.1074 
_IRSS_175 -0.0621 0.0269 -2.3100 0.0210 -0.1149 -0.0094 
_IRSS_176 -0.0739 0.0339 -2.1800 0.0290 -0.1404 -0.0075 
_IRSS_177 -0.0873 0.0267 -3.2700 0.0010 -0.1397 -0.0350 
_IRSS_178 -0.0296 0.0251 -1.1800 0.2390 -0.0787 0.0196 
_IRSS_179 -0.0740 0.0250 -2.9600 0.0030 -0.1230 -0.0251 
_IRSS_180 -0.0816 0.0254 -3.2100 0.0010 -0.1314 -0.0317 
_IRSS_181 -0.0268 0.0251 -1.0700 0.2850 -0.0761 0.0224 
_IRSS_182 -0.0403 0.0258 -1.5600 0.1190 -0.0909 0.0104 
_IRSS_183 -0.1250 0.0271 -4.6100 0.0000 -0.1782 -0.0718 
_IRSS_184 -0.0149 0.0261 -0.5700 0.5670 -0.0661 0.0362 
_IRSS_185 0.0077 0.0253 0.3100 0.7590 -0.0418 0.0573 
_IRSS_186 -0.0021 0.0243 -0.0900 0.9320 -0.0496 0.0455 
_IRSS_187 -0.1062 0.0342 -3.1100 0.0020 -0.1732 -0.0392 
 62
_IRSS_188 -0.1732 0.0311 -5.5700 0.0000 -0.2342 -0.1123 
_IRSS_189 -0.0812 0.0260 -3.1200 0.0020 -0.1323 -0.0302 
_IRSS_190 -0.0167 0.0247 -0.6800 0.4980 -0.0650 0.0316 
_IRSS_191 -0.0198 0.0247 -0.8000 0.4220 -0.0681 0.0286 
_IRSS_192 -0.0196 0.0250 -0.7800 0.4340 -0.0686 0.0295 
_IRSS_193 0.0142 0.0247 0.5800 0.5640 -0.0341 0.0626 
_IRSS_194 -0.0614 0.0268 -2.2900 0.0220 -0.1140 -0.0088 
_IRSS_195 -0.0546 0.0256 -2.1300 0.0330 -0.1048 -0.0044 
_IRSS_196 -0.0317 0.0257 -1.2300 0.2180 -0.0821 0.0187 
_IRSS_197 -0.0934 0.0279 -3.3500 0.0010 -0.1480 -0.0388 
_IRSS_198 -0.0207 0.0272 -0.7600 0.4470 -0.0740 0.0326 
_IRSS_199 -0.0350 0.0274 -1.2800 0.2010 -0.0887 0.0187 
_IRSS_200 -0.0391 0.0255 -1.5400 0.1250 -0.0890 0.0108 
_IRSS_201 -0.0352 0.0274 -1.2900 0.1990 -0.0889 0.0185 
_IRSS_202 -0.0260 0.0272 -0.9600 0.3390 -0.0794 0.0273 
_IRSS_203 -0.0269 0.0241 -1.1100 0.2660 -0.0742 0.0205 
_IRSS_204 -0.0233 0.0284 -0.8200 0.4110 -0.0789 0.0323 
_IRSS_205 -0.0960 0.0276 -3.4800 0.0010 -0.1501 -0.0419 
_IRSS_206 -0.1477 0.0304 -4.8700 0.0000 -0.2072 -0.0883 
_IRSS_207 -0.0089 0.0258 -0.3400 0.7310 -0.0594 0.0417 
_IRSS_208 -0.0027 0.0245 -0.1100 0.9120 -0.0508 0.0454 
_IRSS_209 -0.0912 0.0256 -3.5600 0.0000 -0.1413 -0.0410 
_IRSS_210 -0.0349 0.0243 -1.4300 0.1510 -0.0825 0.0128 
_IRSS_211 -0.0256 0.0254 -1.0100 0.3140 -0.0755 0.0243 
_IRSS_212 -0.0373 0.0261 -1.4300 0.1530 -0.0885 0.0139 
_IRSS_213 -0.0563 0.0258 -2.1800 0.0290 -0.1069 -0.0058 
_IRSS_214 -0.0500 0.0270 -1.8500 0.0640 -0.1029 0.0029 
_IRSS_215 -0.0799 0.0249 -3.2100 0.0010 -0.1287 -0.0310 
_IRSS_216 -0.0599 0.0269 -2.2300 0.0260 -0.1126 -0.0072 
_IRSS_217 -0.0356 0.0277 -1.2900 0.1990 -0.0898 0.0187 
_IRSS_218 -0.0186 0.0251 -0.7400 0.4570 -0.0678 0.0305 
_IRSS_220 -0.0875 0.0339 -2.5900 0.0100 -0.1539 -0.0212 
_IRSS_221 -0.0259 0.0263 -0.9800 0.3250 -0.0774 0.0256 
_IRSS_222 -0.0386 0.0251 -1.5400 0.1250 -0.0879 0.0107 
_IRSS_223 -0.0453 0.0250 -1.8100 0.0700 -0.0943 0.0037 
_IRSS_224 -0.0722 0.0267 -2.7000 0.0070 -0.1246 -0.0198 
_IRSS_225 -0.1233 0.0343 -3.6000 0.0000 -0.1905 -0.0561 
_IRSS_226 -0.0734 0.0277 -2.6500 0.0080 -0.1276 -0.0191 
_IRSS_227 -0.0636 0.0369 -1.7300 0.0850 -0.1358 0.0087 
_IRSS_228 -0.0642 0.0250 -2.5600 0.0100 -0.1133 -0.0151 
 63
_IRSS_229 -0.0156 0.0320 -0.4900 0.6270 -0.0783 0.0472 
_IRSS_230 -0.0675 0.0269 -2.5100 0.0120 -0.1203 -0.0147 
_IRSS_231 -0.0408 0.0254 -1.6000 0.1090 -0.0907 0.0091 
_IRSS_232 -0.0286 0.0256 -1.1200 0.2640 -0.0789 0.0216 
_IRSS_233 -0.1043 0.0253 -4.1200 0.0000 -0.1539 -0.0547 
_IRSS_234 -0.0318 0.0285 -1.1200 0.2640 -0.0877 0.0240 
_IRSS_235 -0.0752 0.0430 -1.7500 0.0800 -0.1595 0.0091 
_IRSS_236 -0.0794 0.0244 -3.2500 0.0010 -0.1273 -0.0315 
_IRSS_237 -0.1017 0.0259 -3.9300 0.0000 -0.1524 -0.0509 
_IRSS_238 -0.0684 0.0247 -2.7700 0.0060 -0.1169 -0.0200 
_IRSS_239 -0.0625 0.0249 -2.5000 0.0120 -0.1114 -0.0136 
_IRSS_240 -0.0081 0.0258 -0.3200 0.7530 -0.0587 0.0425 
_IRSS_241 -0.0286 0.0248 -1.1500 0.2490 -0.0773 0.0201 
_IRSS_242 -0.0498 0.0263 -1.8900 0.0580 -0.1013 0.0017 
_IRSS_243 -0.0534 0.0284 -1.8800 0.0600 -0.1091 0.0023 
_IRSS_244 -0.0368 0.0285 -1.2900 0.1970 -0.0926 0.0191 
_IRSS_245 -0.1224 0.0264 -4.6400 0.0000 -0.1741 -0.0708 
_IRSS_246 -0.0139 0.0271 -0.5100 0.6090 -0.0670 0.0392 
_IRSS_247 -0.0045 0.0240 -0.1900 0.8530 -0.0514 0.0425 
_IRSS_248 -0.0582 0.0261 -2.2300 0.0260 -0.1094 -0.0071 
_IRSS_249 -0.0910 0.0316 -2.8800 0.0040 -0.1530 -0.0290 
_IRSS_250 -0.0950 0.0270 -3.5300 0.0000 -0.1478 -0.0422 
_IRSS_251 -0.0448 0.0274 -1.6300 0.1030 -0.0986 0.0090 
_IRSS_252 -0.0535 0.0273 -1.9600 0.0500 -0.1070 0.0000 
_IRSS_253 -0.0236 0.0266 -0.8900 0.3740 -0.0757 0.0285 
_IRSS_254 -0.0669 0.0251 -2.6700 0.0080 -0.1160 -0.0178 
_IRSS_255 -0.1384 0.0246 -5.6300 0.0000 -0.1866 -0.0902 
_IRSS_256 -0.0420 0.0272 -1.5400 0.1230 -0.0953 0.0114 
_IRSS_257 -0.0393 0.0260 -1.5100 0.1310 -0.0902 0.0117 
_IRSS_258 -0.0426 0.0262 -1.6200 0.1040 -0.0940 0.0088 
_IRSS_259 -0.1134 0.0269 -4.2100 0.0000 -0.1662 -0.0607 
_IRSS_260 -0.1089 0.0253 -4.3000 0.0000 -0.1585 -0.0592 
_IRSS_261 -0.0416 0.0259 -1.6000 0.1090 -0.0925 0.0092 
_IRSS_262 -0.0938 0.0339 -2.7600 0.0060 -0.1604 -0.0273 
_IRSS_263 -0.0397 0.0274 -1.4500 0.1470 -0.0933 0.0139 
_IRSS_264 -0.0406 0.0262 -1.5500 0.1220 -0.0920 0.0108 
_IRSS_265 -0.0293 0.0249 -1.1800 0.2390 -0.0781 0.0195 
_IRSS_266 0.0041 0.0249 0.1600 0.8690 -0.0447 0.0529 
_IRSS_267 -0.0178 0.0263 -0.6800 0.4980 -0.0694 0.0337 
_IRSS_268 -0.0657 0.0316 -2.0800 0.0380 -0.1277 -0.0036 
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_IRSS_269 -0.0284 0.0280 -1.0100 0.3110 -0.0832 0.0265 
_IRSS_270 -0.0476 0.0276 -1.7200 0.0850 -0.1018 0.0066 
_IRSS_271 -0.0649 0.0280 -2.3200 0.0200 -0.1197 -0.0100 
_IRSS_272 -0.0641 0.0242 -2.6500 0.0080 -0.1115 -0.0167 
_IRSS_273 -0.0132 0.0280 -0.4700 0.6390 -0.0681 0.0418 
_IRSS_274 -0.0565 0.0270 -2.0900 0.0360 -0.1094 -0.0036 
_IRSS_275 -0.0327 0.0248 -1.3200 0.1880 -0.0813 0.0160 
_IRSS_276 -0.0405 0.0263 -1.5400 0.1230 -0.0921 0.0110 
_IRSS_277 -0.0101 0.0259 -0.3900 0.6960 -0.0609 0.0406 
_IRSS_278 0.0068 0.0251 0.2700 0.7860 -0.0423 0.0559 
_IRSS_279 -0.0745 0.0247 -3.0100 0.0030 -0.1230 -0.0260 
_IRSS_280 -0.0715 0.0245 -2.9200 0.0040 -0.1195 -0.0235 
_IRSS_281 -0.0373 0.0251 -1.4900 0.1370 -0.0866 0.0119 
_IRSS_282 -0.0067 0.0246 -0.2700 0.7850 -0.0550 0.0415 
_IRSS_283 -0.0177 0.0271 -0.6500 0.5140 -0.0708 0.0354 
_IRSS_284 -0.0434 0.0257 -1.6900 0.0910 -0.0937 0.0069 
_IRSS_285 -0.0667 0.0249 -2.6800 0.0070 -0.1155 -0.0180 
_IRSS_286 -0.0278 0.0260 -1.0700 0.2850 -0.0788 0.0232 
_IRSS_287 -0.1181 0.0275 -4.3000 0.0000 -0.1719 -0.0643 
_IRSS_288 -0.0297 0.0268 -1.1100 0.2680 -0.0822 0.0228 
_IRSS_289 -0.0646 0.0304 -2.1200 0.0340 -0.1241 -0.0050 
_IRSS_290 -0.0673 0.0280 -2.4000 0.0160 -0.1221 -0.0124 
_IRSS_291 -0.0011 0.0261 -0.0400 0.9660 -0.0522 0.0500 
_IRSS_292 -0.0884 0.0291 -3.0300 0.0020 -0.1455 -0.0313 
_IRSS_293 -0.0056 0.0272 -0.2100 0.8370 -0.0590 0.0478 
_IRSS_294 -0.0064 0.0251 -0.2600 0.7980 -0.0556 0.0428 
_IRSS_295 -0.0415 0.0266 -1.5600 0.1190 -0.0938 0.0107 
_IRSS_296 -0.0531 0.0282 -1.8800 0.0600 -0.1084 0.0021 
_IRSS_297 -0.0177 0.0248 -0.7100 0.4750 -0.0663 0.0309 
_IRSS_298 -0.0735 0.0315 -2.3300 0.0200 -0.1354 -0.0117 
_IRSS_299 -0.0234 0.0254 -0.9200 0.3560 -0.0732 0.0263 
_IRSS_300 -0.0963 0.0338 -2.8500 0.0040 -0.1625 -0.0300 
_IRSS_301 -0.0149 0.0259 -0.5700 0.5650 -0.0656 0.0358 
_IRSS_302 -0.0284 0.0260 -1.0900 0.2740 -0.0794 0.0225 
_IRSS_303 -0.0434 0.0255 -1.7000 0.0900 -0.0934 0.0067 
_IRSS_304 0.0182 0.0244 0.7400 0.4560 -0.0297 0.0661 
_IRSS_305 -0.0214 0.0261 -0.8200 0.4120 -0.0725 0.0297 
_IRSS_306 -0.0435 0.0269 -1.6200 0.1060 -0.0962 0.0092 
_IRSS_307 -0.0725 0.0269 -2.7000 0.0070 -0.1252 -0.0198 
_IRSS_308 -0.0029 0.0240 -0.1200 0.9040 -0.0499 0.0441 
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_IRSS_309 -0.0291 0.0245 -1.1900 0.2340 -0.0771 0.0189 
_IRSS_310 -0.0584 0.0271 -2.1500 0.0310 -0.1115 -0.0052 
_IRSS_311 -0.0262 0.0276 -0.9500 0.3420 -0.0803 0.0279 
_IRSS_312 -0.0467 0.0260 -1.8000 0.0720 -0.0976 0.0042 
_IRSS_313 0.0025 0.0260 0.1000 0.9230 -0.0485 0.0535 
_IRSS_314 -0.0238 0.0267 -0.8900 0.3730 -0.0761 0.0286 
_IRSS_315 -0.0740 0.0253 -2.9300 0.0030 -0.1235 -0.0244 
_IRSS_316 -0.0222 0.0254 -0.8700 0.3830 -0.0719 0.0276 
_IRSS_317 -0.0489 0.0252 -1.9400 0.0520 -0.0983 0.0004 
_IRSS_318 -0.0535 0.0263 -2.0400 0.0420 -0.1050 -0.0021 
_IRSS_319 -0.0626 0.0257 -2.4400 0.0150 -0.1130 -0.0123 
_IRSS_320 -0.0601 0.0282 -2.1300 0.0330 -0.1154 -0.0047 
_IRSS_321 -0.0447 0.0253 -1.7700 0.0770 -0.0942 0.0049 
_IRSS_322 -0.1511 0.0260 -5.8000 0.0000 -0.2021 -0.1000 
_IRSS_323 -0.0176 0.0252 -0.7000 0.4850 -0.0670 0.0318 
_IRSS_324 -0.0612 0.0260 -2.3600 0.0180 -0.1122 -0.0103 
_IRSS_325 -0.0374 0.0260 -1.4400 0.1500 -0.0884 0.0136 
_IRSS_326 -0.0303 0.0255 -1.1900 0.2360 -0.0803 0.0198 
_IRSS_327 0.0010 0.0254 0.0400 0.9690 -0.0488 0.0507 
_IRSS_328 -0.0715 0.0272 -2.6300 0.0090 -0.1249 -0.0181 
_IRSS_329 -0.0397 0.0251 -1.5800 0.1140 -0.0889 0.0095 
_IRSS_330 -0.0313 0.0255 -1.2200 0.2210 -0.0813 0.0188 
_IRSS_331 -0.1046 0.0344 -3.0400 0.0020 -0.1721 -0.0371 
_IRSS_332 -0.0427 0.0248 -1.7200 0.0850 -0.0913 0.0059 
_IRSS_333 -0.0139 0.0248 -0.5600 0.5760 -0.0626 0.0348 
_IRSS_334 -0.0068 0.0244 -0.2800 0.7820 -0.0547 0.0411 
_IRSS_335 -0.0111 0.0248 -0.4500 0.6540 -0.0597 0.0375 
_IRSS_336 -0.0178 0.0251 -0.7100 0.4780 -0.0669 0.0314 
_IRSS_337 -0.0238 0.0255 -0.9300 0.3510 -0.0737 0.0262 
_IRSS_339 -0.0163 0.0246 -0.6600 0.5080 -0.0646 0.0320 
_IRSS_340 -0.0247 0.0259 -0.9500 0.3410 -0.0755 0.0261 
_IRSS_341 -0.0627 0.0243 -2.5800 0.0100 -0.1103 -0.0150 
_IRSS_342 -0.1014 0.0293 -3.4600 0.0010 -0.1588 -0.0440 
_IRSS_343 0.0128 0.0274 0.4700 0.6400 -0.0409 0.0665 
_IRSS_344 -0.0133 0.0268 -0.5000 0.6200 -0.0658 0.0392 
_IRSS_345 -0.0080 0.0257 -0.3100 0.7540 -0.0584 0.0423 
_IRSS_346 -0.0520 0.0367 -1.4200 0.1560 -0.1239 0.0198 
_IRSS_347 -0.0558 0.0279 -2.0000 0.0450 -0.1104 -0.0012 
_IRSS_348 -0.0412 0.0253 -1.6300 0.1030 -0.0909 0.0084 
_IRSS_349 -0.0544 0.0247 -2.2000 0.0280 -0.1028 -0.0060 
 66
_IRSS_350 -0.0879 0.0287 -3.0600 0.0020 -0.1441 -0.0317 
_IRSS_351 -0.0319 0.0259 -1.2300 0.2180 -0.0827 0.0189 
_IRSS_352 -0.0896 0.0262 -3.4100 0.0010 -0.1410 -0.0381 
_IRSS_353 -0.0531 0.0279 -1.9000 0.0580 -0.1078 0.0017 
_IRSS_354 -0.0309 0.0254 -1.2200 0.2240 -0.0808 0.0189 
_IRSS_355 -0.0623 0.0242 -2.5800 0.0100 -0.1098 -0.0149 
_IRSS_356 -0.0606 0.0249 -2.4400 0.0150 -0.1094 -0.0118 
_IRSS_357 -0.0208 0.0260 -0.8000 0.4240 -0.0717 0.0302 
_IRSS_358 -0.0110 0.0254 -0.4400 0.6630 -0.0608 0.0387 
_IRSS_359 -0.0550 0.0269 -2.0500 0.0410 -0.1077 -0.0023 
_IRSS_360 -0.0266 0.0253 -1.0500 0.2930 -0.0761 0.0230 
_IRSS_361 -0.0918 0.0282 -3.2600 0.0010 -0.1471 -0.0366 
_IRSS_362 -0.0380 0.0271 -1.4000 0.1610 -0.0911 0.0152 
_IRSS_363 -0.0750 0.0271 -2.7700 0.0060 -0.1281 -0.0219 
_IRSS_364 -0.0186 0.0288 -0.6500 0.5190 -0.0751 0.0379 
_IRSS_365 -0.0428 0.0246 -1.7400 0.0820 -0.0910 0.0054 
_IRSS_366 -0.0380 0.0274 -1.3900 0.1650 -0.0917 0.0156 
_IRSS_367 -0.0261 0.0252 -1.0300 0.3010 -0.0756 0.0234 
_IRSS_368 -0.0384 0.0265 -1.4500 0.1470 -0.0903 0.0135 
_IRSS_369 -0.0522 0.0261 -2.0000 0.0450 -0.1033 -0.0011 
_IRSS_370 -0.0616 0.0265 -2.3300 0.0200 -0.1135 -0.0097 
_IRSS_371 -0.1341 0.0270 -4.9600 0.0000 -0.1872 -0.0811 
_IRSS_372 -0.0211 0.0266 -0.7900 0.4270 -0.0733 0.0310 
_IRSS_373 -0.0629 0.0255 -2.4600 0.0140 -0.1129 -0.0128 
_IRSS_374 -0.0373 0.0253 -1.4700 0.1410 -0.0869 0.0124 
_IRSS_375 -0.0320 0.0241 -1.3300 0.1840 -0.0793 0.0152 
_IRSS_376 -0.0137 0.0259 -0.5300 0.5960 -0.0644 0.0370 
_IRSS_377 -0.0211 0.0250 -0.8400 0.4000 -0.0702 0.0280 
_IRSS_378 -0.0932 0.0279 -3.3400 0.0010 -0.1479 -0.0386 
_IRSS_379 -0.0610 0.0262 -2.3300 0.0200 -0.1123 -0.0098 
_IRSS_380 -0.0360 0.0249 -1.4400 0.1490 -0.0848 0.0129 
_IRSS_381 0.0056 0.0255 0.2200 0.8250 -0.0444 0.0557 
_IRSS_382 -0.0422 0.0277 -1.5200 0.1280 -0.0965 0.0122 
_IRSS_383 -0.0587 0.0261 -2.2500 0.0240 -0.1098 -0.0077 
_IRSS_384 -0.0368 0.0288 -1.2800 0.2010 -0.0932 0.0196 
_IRSS_385 -0.0389 0.0245 -1.5900 0.1130 -0.0870 0.0092 
_IRSS_386 -0.0270 0.0256 -1.0500 0.2920 -0.0772 0.0232 
_IRSS_387 -0.0479 0.0252 -1.9000 0.0580 -0.0973 0.0016 
_IRSS_388 -0.0808 0.0262 -3.0800 0.0020 -0.1322 -0.0293 
_IRSS_389 -0.0527 0.0251 -2.0900 0.0360 -0.1019 -0.0034 
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_IRSS_390 -0.0546 0.0250 -2.1800 0.0290 -0.1036 -0.0056 
_IRSS_391 -0.0532 0.0271 -1.9700 0.0490 -0.1063 -0.0002 
_IRSS_392 -0.0885 0.0254 -3.4800 0.0000 -0.1382 -0.0387 
_IRSS_393 -0.0496 0.0274 -1.8100 0.0700 -0.1033 0.0041 
_IRSS_394 -0.0509 0.0252 -2.0200 0.0440 -0.1004 -0.0014 
_IRSS_395 -0.0134 0.0243 -0.5500 0.5810 -0.0611 0.0342 
_IRSS_396 -0.0820 0.0298 -2.7500 0.0060 -0.1405 -0.0236 
_IRSS_397 -0.1245 0.0261 -4.7800 0.0000 -0.1756 -0.0734 
_IRSS_398 -0.0552 0.0295 -1.8700 0.0620 -0.1131 0.0028 
_IRSS_399 -0.0673 0.0298 -2.2600 0.0240 -0.1256 -0.0089 
_IRSS_400 -0.0306 0.0261 -1.1700 0.2400 -0.0818 0.0205 
_IRSS_401 -0.0650 0.0268 -2.4200 0.0160 -0.1175 -0.0124 
_IRSS_402 -0.0497 0.0277 -1.7900 0.0730 -0.1039 0.0046 
_IRSS_403 -0.0038 0.0245 -0.1500 0.8780 -0.0518 0.0443 
_IRSS_404 -0.0599 0.0265 -2.2600 0.0240 -0.1118 -0.0080 
_IRSS_405 -0.0575 0.0247 -2.3200 0.0200 -0.1060 -0.0090 
_IRSS_406 -0.0487 0.0260 -1.8700 0.0610 -0.0995 0.0022 
_IRSS_407 -0.0682 0.0261 -2.6100 0.0090 -0.1194 -0.0170 
_IRSS_408 -0.0744 0.0256 -2.9000 0.0040 -0.1247 -0.0242 
_IRSS_409 -0.0580 0.0273 -2.1200 0.0340 -0.1116 -0.0044 
_IRSS_410 -0.0142 0.0254 -0.5600 0.5770 -0.0641 0.0357 
_IRSS_411 0.0077 0.0259 0.3000 0.7660 -0.0431 0.0585 
_IRSS_412 -0.1281 0.0253 -5.0700 0.0000 -0.1776 -0.0785 
_IRSS_413 -0.0663 0.0264 -2.5100 0.0120 -0.1179 -0.0146 
_IRSS_414 -0.0443 0.0247 -1.7900 0.0730 -0.0927 0.0041 
_IRSS_415 -0.2148 0.0428 -5.0200 0.0000 -0.2987 -0.1309 
_IRSS_416 -0.0395 0.0285 -1.3900 0.1650 -0.0953 0.0163 
_IRSS_417 -0.0863 0.0272 -3.1700 0.0020 -0.1396 -0.0330 
_IRSS_418 -0.0295 0.0244 -1.2100 0.2280 -0.0774 0.0184 
_IRSS_419 0.2459 0.0339 7.2400 0.0000 0.1793 0.3124 
_IRSS_420 -0.1055 0.0271 -3.9000 0.0000 -0.1586 -0.0524 
_IRSS_421 -0.0577 0.0256 -2.2500 0.0240 -0.1079 -0.0075 
_IRSS_422 -0.1107 0.0289 -3.8400 0.0000 -0.1673 -0.0542 
_IRSS_423 -0.1270 0.0340 -3.7400 0.0000 -0.1937 -0.0604 
_IRSS_424 -0.0184 0.0246 -0.7500 0.4530 -0.0666 0.0298 
_IRSS_425 -0.0069 0.0260 -0.2700 0.7910 -0.0578 0.0440 
_IRSS_426 -0.0690 0.0267 -2.5900 0.0100 -0.1213 -0.0167 
_IRSS_427 -0.0327 0.0259 -1.2600 0.2070 -0.0836 0.0181 
_IRSS_428 -0.0166 0.0274 -0.6100 0.5450 -0.0702 0.0371 
_IRSS_429 -0.0271 0.0246 -1.1000 0.2710 -0.0752 0.0211 
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_IRSS_430 -0.0349 0.0256 -1.3600 0.1730 -0.0852 0.0153 
_IRSS_431 -0.0514 0.0281 -1.8300 0.0680 -0.1065 0.0037 
_IRSS_432 -0.0255 0.0303 -0.8400 0.4010 -0.0849 0.0339 
_IRSS_433 -0.0256 0.0243 -1.0600 0.2910 -0.0732 0.0220 
_IRSS_434 -0.0527 0.0278 -1.9000 0.0580 -0.1072 0.0017 
_IRSS_435 -0.0438 0.0272 -1.6100 0.1070 -0.0971 0.0095 
_IRSS_436 -0.0968 0.0253 -3.8300 0.0000 -0.1464 -0.0472 
_IRSS_437 -0.0048 0.0295 -0.1600 0.8700 -0.0627 0.0530 
_IRSS_438 -0.0618 0.0263 -2.3500 0.0190 -0.1133 -0.0102 
_IRSS_439 -0.0312 0.0281 -1.1100 0.2660 -0.0863 0.0238 
_IRSS_440 -0.0545 0.0342 -1.5900 0.1120 -0.1216 0.0127 
_IRSS_441 -0.0562 0.0253 -2.2200 0.0260 -0.1058 -0.0066 
_IRSS_442 -0.0084 0.0259 -0.3200 0.7460 -0.0593 0.0424 
_IRSS_443 -0.0852 0.0253 -3.3700 0.0010 -0.1348 -0.0357 
_IRSS_444 -0.0365 0.0257 -1.4200 0.1550 -0.0869 0.0138 
_IRSS_445 -0.0865 0.0277 -3.1200 0.0020 -0.1408 -0.0322 
_IRSS_446 -0.0409 0.0272 -1.5000 0.1320 -0.0943 0.0124 
_IRSS_447 -0.0494 0.0281 -1.7500 0.0790 -0.1045 0.0058 
_IRSS_448 -0.0738 0.0251 -2.9400 0.0030 -0.1230 -0.0246 
_IRSS_449 -0.0458 0.0272 -1.6800 0.0930 -0.0992 0.0076 
_IRSS_450 -0.0254 0.0278 -0.9200 0.3590 -0.0798 0.0290 
_IRSS_451 -0.0452 0.0272 -1.6600 0.0970 -0.0986 0.0082 
_IRSS_452 -0.0490 0.0255 -1.9200 0.0540 -0.0990 0.0009 
_IRSS_453 -0.0541 0.0271 -1.9900 0.0460 -0.1073 -0.0009 
_IRSS_454 -0.0258 0.0251 -1.0300 0.3030 -0.0750 0.0233 
_IRSS_455 -0.0623 0.0241 -2.5800 0.0100 -0.1096 -0.0150 
_IRSS_456 -0.0177 0.0251 -0.7100 0.4800 -0.0669 0.0315 
_IRSS_457 -0.1165 0.0270 -4.3200 0.0000 -0.1694 -0.0636 
_IRSS_458 -0.0648 0.0257 -2.5300 0.0120 -0.1151 -0.0145 
_IRSS_459 -0.0074 0.0250 -0.2900 0.7680 -0.0564 0.0417 
_IRSS_460 -0.0318 0.0261 -1.2200 0.2230 -0.0830 0.0194 
_IRSS_461 -0.0830 0.0260 -3.1900 0.0010 -0.1340 -0.0319 
_IRSS_462 -0.0990 0.0310 -3.1900 0.0010 -0.1598 -0.0382 
_IRSS_463 0.0105 0.0244 0.4300 0.6670 -0.0373 0.0583 
_IRSS_464 -0.0337 0.0253 -1.3300 0.1830 -0.0833 0.0159 
_IRSS_465 -0.0561 0.0248 -2.2600 0.0240 -0.1046 -0.0075 
_IRSS_466 -0.0192 0.0253 -0.7600 0.4500 -0.0688 0.0305 
_IRSS_467 -0.0104 0.0262 -0.4000 0.6920 -0.0617 0.0410 
_IRSS_468 -0.0904 0.0256 -3.5400 0.0000 -0.1405 -0.0403 
_IRSS_469 -0.1064 0.0240 -4.4200 0.0000 -0.1535 -0.0592 
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_IRSS_470 -0.0329 0.0251 -1.3100 0.1900 -0.0821 0.0163 
_IRSS_471 -0.0775 0.0255 -3.0500 0.0020 -0.1274 -0.0276 
_IRSS_472 -0.0748 0.0259 -2.8900 0.0040 -0.1256 -0.0241 
_IRSS_474 -0.0610 0.0252 -2.4200 0.0150 -0.1103 -0.0117 
_IRSS_475 -0.0496 0.0263 -1.8900 0.0590 -0.1011 0.0020 
_IRSS_476 -0.0739 0.0339 -2.1800 0.0290 -0.1404 -0.0074 
_IRSS_477 -0.0061 0.0253 -0.2400 0.8100 -0.0558 0.0436 
_IRSS_478 -0.0552 0.0262 -2.1100 0.0350 -0.1065 -0.0039 
_IRSS_479 -0.0715 0.0262 -2.7200 0.0060 -0.1229 -0.0200 
_IRSS_480 -0.0430 0.0258 -1.6700 0.0960 -0.0936 0.0076 
_IRSS_481 -0.0553 0.0247 -2.2400 0.0250 -0.1037 -0.0069 
_IRSS_482 -0.0559 0.0241 -2.3200 0.0200 -0.1031 -0.0087 
_IRSS_483 -0.0767 0.0299 -2.5700 0.0100 -0.1353 -0.0181 
_IRSS_484 -0.0183 0.0269 -0.6800 0.4980 -0.0710 0.0345 
_IRSS_485 -0.0647 0.0242 -2.6700 0.0080 -0.1122 -0.0172 
_IRSS_486 -0.0691 0.0251 -2.7500 0.0060 -0.1184 -0.0199 
_IRSS_487 -0.0145 0.0252 -0.5700 0.5650 -0.0638 0.0349 
_IRSS_488 -0.0608 0.0250 -2.4300 0.0150 -0.1098 -0.0118 
_IRSS_489 -0.0883 0.0242 -3.6400 0.0000 -0.1358 -0.0408 
_IRSS_490 -0.0358 0.0273 -1.3100 0.1900 -0.0894 0.0178 
_IRSS_491 -0.0658 0.0255 -2.5800 0.0100 -0.1159 -0.0158 
_IRSS_492 -0.1125 0.0278 -4.0500 0.0000 -0.1669 -0.0580 
_IRSS_493 -0.1045 0.0345 -3.0300 0.0020 -0.1721 -0.0368 
_IRSS_494 -0.0519 0.0256 -2.0300 0.0430 -0.1020 -0.0018 
_IRSS_495 -0.0212 0.0261 -0.8100 0.4180 -0.0724 0.0300 
_IRSS_496 -0.0001 0.0248 0.0000 0.9980 -0.0488 0.0486 
_IRSS_497 -0.0705 0.0288 -2.4500 0.0140 -0.1269 -0.0140 
_IRSS_498 -0.0161 0.0250 -0.6400 0.5210 -0.0651 0.0330 
_IRSS_500 -0.0477 0.0254 -1.8800 0.0610 -0.0976 0.0022 
_IRSS_501 -0.0848 0.0295 -2.8800 0.0040 -0.1425 -0.0270 
_IRSS_502 -0.1489 0.0334 -4.4600 0.0000 -0.2144 -0.0835 
_IRSS_503 -0.0169 0.0241 -0.7000 0.4830 -0.0643 0.0304 
_IRSS_504 -0.0020 0.0251 -0.0800 0.9380 -0.0511 0.0472 
_IRSS_505 -0.0379 0.0282 -1.3500 0.1780 -0.0931 0.0173 
_IRSS_506 -0.1019 0.0270 -3.7700 0.0000 -0.1548 -0.0490 
_IRSS_507 0.0087 0.0267 0.3300 0.7430 -0.0436 0.0611 
_IRSS_508 -0.0388 0.0257 -1.5100 0.1310 -0.0891 0.0116 
_IRSS_509 -0.1299 0.0285 -4.5500 0.0000 -0.1858 -0.0740 
_IRSS_510 -0.0170 0.0264 -0.6400 0.5200 -0.0688 0.0348 
_IRSS_511 0.0125 0.0243 0.5200 0.6060 -0.0352 0.0602 
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_IRSS_512 -0.0345 0.0242 -1.4200 0.1540 -0.0820 0.0130 
_IRSS_513 -0.0653 0.0258 -2.5300 0.0120 -0.1160 -0.0146 
_IRSS_514 -0.0269 0.0262 -1.0300 0.3050 -0.0783 0.0245 
_IRSS_515 -0.0612 0.0266 -2.3000 0.0210 -0.1133 -0.0091 
_IRSS_516 -0.0606 0.0245 -2.4700 0.0130 -0.1086 -0.0126 
_IRSS_517 -0.0474 0.0323 -1.4700 0.1430 -0.1107 0.0160 
_IRSS_518 -0.0179 0.0267 -0.6700 0.5030 -0.0703 0.0345 
_IRSS_519 -0.0014 0.0278 -0.0500 0.9590 -0.0560 0.0531 
_IRSS_520 -0.0630 0.0250 -2.5200 0.0120 -0.1119 -0.0141 
_IRSS_521 -0.0611 0.0254 -2.4000 0.0160 -0.1110 -0.0112 
_IRSS_522 -0.0541 0.0271 -1.9900 0.0460 -0.1073 -0.0009 
_IRSS_523 0.0039 0.0261 0.1500 0.8810 -0.0472 0.0550 
_IRSS_524 -0.0598 0.0273 -2.1900 0.0290 -0.1133 -0.0062 
_IRSS_525 -0.0778 0.0259 -3.0100 0.0030 -0.1286 -0.0271 
_IRSS_526 -0.0282 0.0259 -1.0900 0.2750 -0.0789 0.0225 
_IRSS_527 -0.0846 0.0251 -3.3700 0.0010 -0.1338 -0.0353 
_IRSS_528 -0.0512 0.0253 -2.0200 0.0430 -0.1007 -0.0016 
_IRSS_529 -0.0407 0.0272 -1.5000 0.1340 -0.0939 0.0126 
_IRSS_530 -0.0461 0.0277 -1.6600 0.0960 -0.1004 0.0082 
_IRSS_531 -0.0171 0.0252 -0.6800 0.4960 -0.0665 0.0322 
_IRSS_532 -0.0166 0.0252 -0.6600 0.5120 -0.0660 0.0329 
_IRSS_533 -0.0250 0.0272 -0.9200 0.3590 -0.0783 0.0284 
_IRSS_534 0.0351 0.0269 1.3000 0.1920 -0.0177 0.0879 
_IRSS_535 -0.1948 0.0285 -6.8400 0.0000 -0.2506 -0.1390 
_IRSS_536 -0.0370 0.0258 -1.4300 0.1520 -0.0876 0.0137 
_IRSS_537 0.0019 0.0247 0.0800 0.9370 -0.0466 0.0504 
_IRSS_538 -0.0245 0.0261 -0.9400 0.3490 -0.0757 0.0268 
_IRSS_539 -0.0656 0.0250 -2.6200 0.0090 -0.1146 -0.0166 
_IRSS_540 -0.0738 0.0258 -2.8600 0.0040 -0.1245 -0.0232 
_IRSS_541 -0.0676 0.0249 -2.7200 0.0070 -0.1163 -0.0189 
_IRSS_542 -0.0150 0.0257 -0.5800 0.5610 -0.0654 0.0355 
_IRSS_543 -0.0542 0.0259 -2.0900 0.0370 -0.1051 -0.0034 
_IRSS_544 -0.0819 0.0249 -3.2900 0.0010 -0.1307 -0.0330 
_IRSS_545 -0.0635 0.0295 -2.1500 0.0310 -0.1212 -0.0057 
_IRSS_546 -0.0865 0.0301 -2.8700 0.0040 -0.1455 -0.0275 
_IRSS_547 -0.0761 0.0262 -2.9100 0.0040 -0.1275 -0.0248 
_IRSS_548 -0.1182 0.0339 -3.4900 0.0000 -0.1846 -0.0517 
_IRSS_549 -0.1024 0.0290 -3.5300 0.0000 -0.1592 -0.0456 
_IRSS_550 -0.0369 0.0284 -1.3000 0.1940 -0.0926 0.0188 
_IRSS_551 -0.0419 0.0241 -1.7400 0.0830 -0.0893 0.0054 
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_IRSS_552 -0.1285 0.0254 -5.0500 0.0000 -0.1784 -0.0787 
_IRSS_553 -0.0187 0.0254 -0.7300 0.4630 -0.0685 0.0311 
_IRSS_554 -0.0596 0.0243 -2.4500 0.0140 -0.1073 -0.0120 
_IRSS_555 -0.0410 0.0274 -1.5000 0.1340 -0.0947 0.0126 
_IRSS_556 -0.0309 0.0266 -1.1600 0.2450 -0.0831 0.0212 
_IRSS_557 -0.0617 0.0250 -2.4600 0.0140 -0.1108 -0.0126 
_IRSS_558 0.0796 0.0321 2.4800 0.0130 0.0166 0.1426 
_IRSS_559 -0.0470 0.0255 -1.8400 0.0650 -0.0969 0.0030 
_IRSS_560 -0.0371 0.0289 -1.2800 0.1990 -0.0938 0.0196 
_IRSS_561 -0.0465 0.0252 -1.8400 0.0660 -0.0960 0.0030 
_IRSS_562 -0.0198 0.0248 -0.8000 0.4250 -0.0683 0.0288 
_IRSS_563 -0.0038 0.0269 -0.1400 0.8890 -0.0566 0.0491 
_IRSS_564 -0.0474 0.0256 -1.8500 0.0640 -0.0975 0.0027 
_IRSS_565 -0.0181 0.0240 -0.7600 0.4500 -0.0651 0.0289 
_IRSS_566 -0.0653 0.0241 -2.7100 0.0070 -0.1125 -0.0181 
_IRSS_567 0.0099 0.0278 0.3600 0.7210 -0.0445 0.0644 
_IRSS_568 -0.1029 0.0270 -3.8100 0.0000 -0.1559 -0.0500 
_IRSS_569 -0.0615 0.0261 -2.3600 0.0180 -0.1125 -0.0104 
_IRSS_570 -0.0803 0.0282 -2.8500 0.0040 -0.1355 -0.0250 
_IRSS_571 -0.0430 0.0262 -1.6400 0.1000 -0.0944 0.0083 
_IRSS_572 -0.0336 0.0266 -1.2600 0.2060 -0.0857 0.0185 
_IRSS_573 -0.0260 0.0255 -1.0200 0.3070 -0.0760 0.0240 
_IRSS_574 -0.0153 0.0243 -0.6300 0.5280 -0.0630 0.0323 
_IRSS_575 -0.0598 0.0274 -2.1900 0.0290 -0.1134 -0.0062 
_IRSS_576 -0.0054 0.0251 -0.2100 0.8300 -0.0547 0.0439 
_IRSS_577 -0.0943 0.0250 -3.7700 0.0000 -0.1433 -0.0452 
_IRSS_578 -0.0297 0.0257 -1.1500 0.2490 -0.0801 0.0207 
_IRSS_579 -0.0395 0.0265 -1.4900 0.1350 -0.0914 0.0124 
_IRSS_580 -0.0415 0.0276 -1.5100 0.1320 -0.0956 0.0125 
_IRSS_581 -0.0066 0.0248 -0.2700 0.7900 -0.0552 0.0420 
_IRSS_582 -0.0870 0.0278 -3.1300 0.0020 -0.1415 -0.0324 
_IRSS_583 -0.0708 0.0316 -2.2400 0.0250 -0.1326 -0.0089 
_IRSS_584 -0.0217 0.0277 -0.7800 0.4330 -0.0760 0.0326 
_IRSS_585 0.0053 0.0241 0.2200 0.8250 -0.0419 0.0526 
_IRSS_586 -0.0500 0.0268 -1.8600 0.0620 -0.1027 0.0026 
_IRSS_587 -0.0288 0.0247 -1.1700 0.2430 -0.0772 0.0196 
_IRSS_588 -0.1786 0.0315 -5.6700 0.0000 -0.2403 -0.1168 
_IRSS_589 -0.0422 0.0249 -1.7000 0.0900 -0.0909 0.0066 
_IRSS_590 0.0177 0.0250 0.7100 0.4780 -0.0312 0.0667 
_IRSS_591 -0.0603 0.0245 -2.4600 0.0140 -0.1083 -0.0123 
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_IRSS_592 -0.0199 0.0242 -0.8200 0.4100 -0.0674 0.0275 
_IRSS_593 -0.0197 0.0259 -0.7600 0.4460 -0.0704 0.0310 
_IRSS_594 -0.0512 0.0259 -1.9700 0.0480 -0.1020 -0.0003 
_IRSS_595 -0.0008 0.0251 -0.0300 0.9750 -0.0501 0.0485 
_IRSS_596 -0.0449 0.0256 -1.7600 0.0790 -0.0951 0.0052 
_IRSS_597 -0.0841 0.0276 -3.0500 0.0020 -0.1381 -0.0301 
_IRSS_598 -0.0614 0.0272 -2.2600 0.0240 -0.1147 -0.0082 
_IRSS_599 -0.0488 0.0274 -1.7800 0.0750 -0.1025 0.0050 
_IRSS_600 -0.0252 0.0259 -0.9700 0.3310 -0.0760 0.0256 
_IRSS_601 -0.0532 0.0251 -2.1200 0.0340 -0.1025 -0.0040 
_IRSS_602 -0.0999 0.0280 -3.5700 0.0000 -0.1548 -0.0451 
_IRSS_603 -0.0508 0.0257 -1.9800 0.0480 -0.1011 -0.0005 
_IRSS_604 -0.0183 0.0262 -0.7000 0.4850 -0.0696 0.0330 
_IRSS_605 -0.0907 0.0281 -3.2300 0.0010 -0.1458 -0.0357 
_IRSS_606 -0.0641 0.0251 -2.5500 0.0110 -0.1134 -0.0148 
year_2003 -0.0023 0.0041 -0.5700 0.5710 -0.0103 0.0057 
year_2004 -0.0178 0.0039 -4.6000 0.0000 -0.0254 -0.0102 
year_2005 -0.0198 0.0031 -6.3000 0.0000 -0.0259 -0.0136 
year_2006 -0.0080 0.0032 -2.5000 0.0120 -0.0142 -0.0017 
year_2007 (dropped)           
qtr_1 -0.0008 0.0020 -0.3800 0.7040 -0.0047 0.0032 
qtr_2 0.0147 0.0022 6.7900 0.0000 0.0104 0.0189 
qtr_3 0.0365 0.0020 18.2400 0.0000 0.0326 0.0404 
qtr_4 (dropped)           
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